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Racial bloc voting is the central concept in judicial regulation of redistricting. 
For the past several decades, the definition and proof of this concept have 
depended on two premises: that polities can be conceptualized in biracial terms 
and that nearly perfect information on voting patterns can be inexpensively 
obtained from simple statistical methods. In fact, however, neither premise has 
been true for some time, as the nation has become multiracial and allegations have 
increased that Caucasians vote less monolithically than before, with both 
assertions imposing severe stress on the simple statistical methods previously used 
to assess voting patterns. In this article, I analyze these challenges to traditional 
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understandings and attempt to answer the following question: how can we litigate 
racial bloc voting well in the current era? I provide recommendations, including 
greater reliance on more sophisticated statistical methods, an increase in the use of 
sample surveys, and a renewed receptivity to nonquantitative evidence on voting 
patterns, while clarifying that each of these recommendations carries substantial 
costs. I then discuss the conceptual and normative implications of my 
recommendations on the empirics. 
INTRODUCTION 
With the passage of the 2010 U.S. census comes the decennial process of 
filtering our nation’s representative structure, particularly the redistricting process 
the Constitution compels,
1 through the judiciary. Because the Supreme Court, 
specifically Justice Kennedy, remains unwilling to endorse a standard to govern 
claims of undue partisanship in the drawing of district lines,
2 the primary federal 
litigation weapon
3 for those seeking to alter or influence an officially adopted 
districting scheme will remain a lawsuit based on a theory of racial vote dilution. I 
use the phrase “vote dilution” to refer to the interaction of voting patterns, some 
aspect of a system of translating votes into political power (a districting scheme, for 
example), and the surrounding circumstances such that the strength wielded by 
some identifiable and salient group is less than what is thought to be the right 
amount. When the group is defined by race,
4 and when an acceptable remedy 
exists, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
5 renders vote dilution illegal. 
Election jurisprudence generally, and redistricting law in particular, has never 
been overly characterized by clarity or stability,
6 and it seems unlikely that the 
2010 round of redistricting will bring much of either. The continued dissatisfaction 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1.    Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), 
compel states to redraw lines to achieve either exact (in the case of Congress) or rough (for 
other levels of government) population equality among districts. 
 2.    See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306–17 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
  3.   The overuse-of-race-theory the Supreme Court endorsed in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
630 (1993), and clarified in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), resulted in few lawsuits 
in the 2000 round of redistricting. At least one prominent commentator has attributed this 
dearth to redistricters’ internalization of the Shaw standard (conceptualized as a prohibition 
on bizarrely shaped districts). Richard H. Pildes, Foreword, The Constitutionalization of 
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 67–68 (2004). If Professor Pildes is correct on 
this score, as seems likely, the 2010 round is similarly likely to see little Shaw litigation. 
  4.   For convenience, except in footnote 18, I use the terms “race” and “racial” in this 
Article as shorthand for either race or ethnicity. For similar reasons, I use the terms 
“Hispanic” and “Latino” interchangeably, as I do “Caucasian” and “white” and “African 
American” and “black.” 
  5.   42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
 6.    See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Rashomon and the Roberts Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1213, 1235 (2007) (noting that “doctrinal categories are breaking down”); Richard L. Hasen, 
Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral 
Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 945 (2005); Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All 
These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 288 (1995) (noting 
“doctrinal instability”). 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 449 
 
of a more conservative Supreme Court with law articulated in earlier decades is 
likely to be a source of evolution in racial vote dilution jurisprudence,
7 but an equal 
impetus to change may be questions as to whether evolving circumstances on the 
ground have called into doubt the empirical foundations of the law. For at least the 
past twenty-five or so years, racial vote dilution litigation, particularly under 
section 2,
 has rested on two premises. First, courts and litigants could frame vote 
dilution litigation in biracial
8 terms by comparing the preferences of the plaintiffs’ 
racial group (say, “black”) to those outside that group, so, for example, “white” is 
the same thing as “non-black.” The second premise is that despite the secret ballot, 
litigants and courts could obtain nearly perfect numerical information about voting 
patterns of a jurisdiction’s racial groups relatively quickly, relatively cheaply, and 
for as far back historically as desired. It has been thought possible to accomplish 
this feat by analyzing census data (usually) and precinct-level vote returns via a set 
of methods collectively called “ecological inference.”
9 These two premises 
underlay the merger
10 of doctrine and empirics
11 contained in the phrase “racially 
polarized voting” (equivalently, “racial bloc voting”), which has been the 
“keystone”
12 of vote dilution. Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the importance of 
the concept of racial bloc voting to the law and theory in this area; for whatever the 
phrase means, it defines the dilution injury under widely disparate accounts of 
voting and democracy,
13 justifies entry into the “racial thicket”
14 by a reluctant 
judiciary,
15 and distinguishes official use of race in redistricting from official use of 
race in other settings.
16 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7.    See Richard H. Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 
68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1139 (2007). 
  8.   By “biracial” I mean the presence in a polity of only two relevant racial groups. 
 9.    See, e.g., GARY  KING,  A  SOLUTION TO THE ECOLOGICAL  INFERENCE  PROBLEM  3 
(1997). 
 10.    Samuel  Issacharoff,  Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The 
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1847 (1992); see 
also Bernard Grofman, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of Voting Rights Case 
Law, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 197, 199 & n.5 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler 
Davidson eds., 1992). 
 11.    See Grofman, supra note 10, at 223–24. 
  12.   United States v. Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1566 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 13.    See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 1663, 1667 (2001) (arguing that the right to an undiluted vote is an aggregate right 
threatened by racial bloc voting); Issacharoff, supra note 10, at 1867–72, 1885–90 (showing 
how racial bloc voting undermines the fundamental assumptions of both process-based and 
social choice theories of democracy); Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 
117 YALE  L.J. 734, 752–53 (2008) (clarifying that under a theory of “democratic 
contestation” racial bloc voting paralyzes the “political discourse” that would otherwise 
challenge citizens with “political choices about their political identity and sensibilities”). 
 14.    Cf. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (warning against judicial entry 
into the “political thicket”). 
 15.    Issacharoff,  supra note 10, at 1867–71. 
 16.    See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 679–80 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). Compare 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (In redistricting, a constitutional violation 
occurs only if race is the “predominant factor.”), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 450  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
Increasingly, however, the two premises identified above are no longer true. 
Actually, the second was never true, although in many areas of the nation where 
vote dilution lawsuits were brought, the consequences in a particular case of 
believing the fiction of nearly perfect information may have been minimal.
17 Fewer 
fact situations fit this mold now, and in any event, both premises have come under 
pressure from two developments: the United States has become more multiracial 
than before,
18 and questions have arisen as to whether Caucasians vote against 
minority groups’ candidates of choice as monolithically as they allegedly did 
before. Commentators have identified these changes previously,
19 but few in 
academia or elsewhere have attempted to understand the challenges raised or to 
propose solutions, particularly with respect to the question of how to adjudicate 
whether voting is racially polarized. On the contrary, perhaps the most prominent 
expert witness in this field
20 has recently argued that models needed to make sense 
of multiracial data do not exist;
21 among the purposes of this Article is to show that 
this statement is not correct. 
                                                                                                                 
(2003) (“[A]ll governmental action based on race” is subject to strict scrutiny.). 
 17.    See Richard L. Engstrom, Comment, Getting the Numbers Right: A Response to 
Wildgen, 22 URB.  LAW. 495, 495 (1990) (noting that in many early cases methodology 
mattered little because almost all reasonable methods would yield the conclusion that voting 
was racially polarized). 
 18.    See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN (2001), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf (stating that in 2000 the 
United States population was 12.5% Hispanic (of any race), 12.3% black, and 3.6% Asian); 
WILLIAM  H.  FREY, POPULATION  STUDIES  CTR.,  RACE,  IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA’S 
CHANGING  ELECTORATE  2 (2008) (Research Report 08-635), available at http://frey-
demographer.org/reports/R-2008-1_RaceImmAmChangingElectorate.pdf.  
 19.    See Melissa L. Saunders, Of Minority Representation, Multiple-Race Responses, 
and Melting Pots: Redistricting in the New America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1367, 1370–73 (2001); 
see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1185, 1211 (2007). On allegations of decreasing white bloc voting, see Charles S. Bullock, 
III & Richard E. Dunn, The Demise of Racial Districting and the Future of Black 
Representation, 48 EMORY L.J. 1209 (1999); Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at 
War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C.  L.  REV. 1517 
(2002); Note, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining Racially 
Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208 (2003). Regarding biraciality, see Pildes, supra 
note 7, at 1147. 
    Note that I do not necessarily endorse the assertion that racially correlated voting is 
in fact declining, particularly with respect to local and municipal contests as opposed to the 
congressional and state legislative elections that tend to draw scholarly attention. 
Interestingly, the most sophisticated analysis I have seen to date provides little reason to 
think that bloc voting has decreased in any important way in the nation as a whole. See 
Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Race, Region, and Vote 
Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 1385 (2010). 
  20.   Professor Grofman was the plaintiffs’ expert in the district court litigation in 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 53 (1986), and has testified in dozens of cases since 
then. 
 21.    See Bernard Grofman & Matt A. Barreto, A Reply to Zax’s (2002) Critique of 
Grofman and Migalski (1988), 37 SOC. METHODS & RES. 599, 614 n.14 (2009). 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 451 
 
In this Article, I seek to answer the following question: how can we litigate the 
issue of racial bloc voting (and thus vote dilution) well in an era characterized by 
increasing racial diversity and allegations that white bloc voting may be 
decreasing? The answer turns out to require work on at least three different fronts: 
doctrine, ecological inference, and alternative information sources. To begin, we 
need either to refine doctrinal definitions or to acknowledge that in this area the 
definitions themselves matter less than the nature of the evidence upon which we 
rely in actual cases (either would do). As a corollary, any doctrinal developments 
should be structured in light of the sharp limits on how much available sources of 
information can tell us about voting patterns. Second, we need to use more 
advanced statistical techniques to analyze the kind of data upon which courts have 
routinely relied in section 2 litigation—namely, precinct-level vote returns as 
married to demographic information from (usually) the U.S. census. Techniques 
used to analyze this type of data are called “ecological inference” methods and, at 
the risk of oversimplification, there are good ones and bad ones. For years, experts 
and courts have relied on bad ones. At first, this reliance stemmed from the lack of 
another option; more recently it is due to inertia and habit. Inertia must be 
overcome, and habits must change. Finally, we need to use alternative sources of 
information, including sample surveys and nonquantitative evidence, both of which 
are regularly used by candidates and political analysts, but neither of which has as 
of yet gained much traction in court cases. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I briefly trace the legal 
development of the doctrine of racial bloc voting from its ascendency in Thornburg 
v. Gingles
22 to the present day,
23 focusing in particular on the nature of the evidence 
upon which courts have relied to adjudicate whether voting in a jurisdiction is 
racially polarized and on the pressure differing strands of legal doctrine have placed 
on that evidence. While judicial consumption of evidence from ecological inference 
techniques has remained unchanged since at least 1986,
24 doctrine has been less 
static, and the case law is moving towards greater reliance on the untrue premises 
of cheap, quick, near-perfect information and biraciality identified above. 
In Part II, I show how and why racial diversity and the allegedly decreasing 
uniformity of white bloc voting have put increasing pressure on empirical 
techniques in this area generally and especially on ecological inference methods. 
Recent advances, particularly a technique Kevin Quinn and I developed called the 
“GQ Model,” can alleviate some of this pressure, but even modern ecological 
inference methods will not be enough in all cases. Until the statistical community 
creates production-ready ways to add other forms of quantitative information into 
the equations used,
25 even cutting-edge techniques such as the GQ Model will be 
                                                                                                                 
 
  22.   478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
  23.   Professor Issacharoff traces the pre-Gingles history of racial bloc voting in 
Issacharoff, supra note 10. 
 24.    D.  James  Greiner,  Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are 
We Now, and Where Do We Want To Be?, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 115 app. A (2007). 
  25.   Efforts to create such production-ready methods are underway. See D. James 
Greiner & Kevin M. Quinn, Exit Polling and Racial Bloc Voting: Combining Individual-
Level  and R x C Ecological Data (Harvard Law School Public Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009) (on file with the author). 452  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
able to tell us only so much, and (if current trends continue) less and less as time 
progresses. Accordingly, we should ask ourselves whether other sources of 
information on racial bloc voting are available. 
In Part III, I shift from the descriptive and the analytical to propose alterations to 
current doctrine and empirics. On the empirical side, I limit myself to 
recommending inferential techniques that I have personally implemented. Although 
by necessity I propose a doctrinal definition of racial bloc voting, I suggest that the 
critical issue is less the words used to define the phrase than the evidence used to 
adjudicate the issue. Empirically, my primary suggestion is that experts, litigators, 
and courts stand ready to lessen (perhaps eliminate) their reliance on ecological 
inference techniques in favor of other sources of information, principally surveys 
and nonquantitative evidence. My discussion includes a focus on the costs to this 
approach. 
Part IV provides a short case study in the form of an analysis of voting patterns 
for the Boston City Council to demonstrate the viability of my proposals. 
A final word on terminology: I have thus far used terms loosely, mirroring the 
looseness in judicial opinions. For the remainder of this Article, I use the term 
“racially correlated voting” to refer to the factual existence of a pattern (whatever 
its cause) associating voter race and voter preference; as I discuss, the nature and 
strength of the correlation needed to be legally relevant is uncertain. The 
(concededly awkward) phrase “racially caused voting” denotes the subset of 
racially correlated voting patterns that are in some way caused by racial animus in 
the electorate; ordinarily, this is thought of as white voter animus against minority-
preferred candidates (who are frequently of minority race).
26 I reserve the terms 
“racial bloc voting” and “racially polarized voting” to refer to the set of 
circumstances sufficient to trigger legal consequences in a vote dilution–based 
challenge to a districting scheme. 
I. RACIAL BLOC VOTING FROM GINGLES TO THE PRESENT: HOW THE EVOLUTION 
WAS PREMISED ON CHEAP, NEAR-PERFECT, BIRACIAL INFORMATION 
A. Gingles and Questions 
In Thornburg v. Gingles
27 the Supreme Court adopted a framework for vote 
dilution challenges consisting of a set of thresholds followed by a totality-of-
                                                                                                                 
 
  26.    This issue has been variously phrased as whether racial animus as opposed to 
interest group politics were causing racially disparate voting patterns, or whether race (of the 
voter or the candidate) not political party was “the reason for” such patterns, or whether 
minority voter cohesion was a defensive as opposed to a calculated move. See Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 83 (1986) (White, J., concurring) (“interest-group politics”); id. at 478 
U.S. at 100 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“the reasons why”); League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 855–59 (5th Cir. 1993) (party not race); Black Political 
Task Force v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 298 (D. Mass. 2004) (“causation”); John O. 
Calmore,  Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New Demography in a Multiracing 
America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1273 (2001) (questioning whether “black bloc voting is . . . 
the initial fire [or] the return fire”). 
  27.   478 U.S. 30 (1986). 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 453 
 
circumstances analysis.
28 A plaintiff challenging a districting scheme
29 first proved 
the three now-familiar Gingles prerequisites—that is the existence of a 
geographically compact racial minority population numerous enough to constitute a 
majority in a single-membered district,
30 political cohesiveness in the minority 
population,
31 and white voting patterns that ordinarily defeated the minority’s 
candidates of choice.
32 If a plaintiff proved the three prerequisites, a totality-of-
circumstances stage followed, in which courts were to focus on a nonexhaustive set 
of factors listed in a Senate Report accompanying the passage of the 1982 
amendments to section 2
33 with an eye to deciding whether members of the 
plaintiff’s group had “less opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”
34 
The second and third Gingles prerequisites came to be considered together under 
the rubric of racial bloc voting,
35 and at the totality-of-circumstances stage, the 
extent of racial bloc voting was one of the two most important factors in deciding 
the ultimate question of vote dilution.
36 Thus, racial bloc voting ascended to “the 
undisputed and unchallenged center of the Voting Rights Act.”
37 
As Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court in Gingles sought to provide a 
doctrinal roadmap for courts adjudicating vote dilution cases, it did so with an eye 
to the nature of the evidence upon which courts would rely to decide whether 
voting was racially polarized. In this regard, Justice Brennan made three moves 
important for this Article. First, in a section of his opinion receiving only four 
votes, Justice Brennan sought to equate racially polarized voting with racially 
correlated voting,
38 resisting any effort to include in the inquiry whether voting was 
racially caused.
39 
                                                                                                                 
 
  28.   Prior to the 1982 amendments to section 2, courts had employed a single-stage, 
multi-factored test. See  White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–70 (1973); Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 152–55 (1971); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305–07 (5th 
Cir. 1973) (en banc). 
 29.    See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993) (extending the Gingles framework to 
include challenges to single-member districting schemes). 
 30.    Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. The Supreme Court’s preference for single-membered 
districts, particularly as part of a judicially imposed remedy, predated Gingles. See Chapman 
v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1975). 
 31.    Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. 
 32.    Id. 
 33.    S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177. 
  34.   42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006). 
 35.    See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 93 (1997). 
 36.    Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15. The other was the extent of success of candidates of 
minority race. Id. 
 37.    Issacharoff,  supra note 10, at 1851. Note that the California Voting Rights Act is 
modeled after section 2 but expressly eliminates the first Gingles prerequisite as a threshold 
for liability (although the viability of a single-membered district may be considered at the 
remedial stage). CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14028(c) (West 2003). 
 38.    Gingles, 478 U.S. at 61–74. See supra text accompanying note 26 for my use of 
these terms. 
  39.   The California Voting Rights Act defines racially polarized voting exclusively in 
terms of racially correlated voting. ELEC. § 14026(e). It also provides that statistical methods 454  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
Second, Justice Brennan’s discussion of the evidence regarding racial bloc 
voting was entirely numerical.
40 Specifically, Justice Brennan relied exclusively on 
evidence (derived from ecological inference techniques) from one of the plaintiffs’ 
experts regarding the percentages of black and white voters supporting black 
candidates; his point was that the former percentage was high, the latter was low, 
and black-preferred candidates usually lost.
41 This exclusively numerical focus 
created an apparent separation between quantitative evidence regarding voting 
patterns and a variety of other forms of potentially informative evidence about such 
patterns that were now apparently relevant only at the totality-of-circumstances 
stage (e.g., the use of race-based campaign appeals). As explained below, courts 
have followed this near-exclusive focus on the numbers in adjudicating section 2 
challenges to redistricting. 
Third, Justice Brennan’s numerical discussion included a footnote observing 
that the plaintiffs’ expert in the case had used two particular ecological inference 
techniques called “extreme case” (also known as “homogenous precincts”) analysis 
and “ecological regression.”
42 As I have detailed elsewhere,
43 this observation was 
read as an endorsement of these two ecological inference methods, which exercised 
a stranglehold on empirical proof in vote dilution litigation for the next decades, 
despite growing indications of their shortcomings and the emergence of superior 
methods.
44 
B. Post-Gingles Questions and Trends 
Several questions remained unanswered after Gingles, two of which concern the 
themes of this Article because they demonstrate how the evolution of racial bloc 
voting doctrine has depended on the presumed availability of cheap, near-perfect 
information about voting patterns in a biracial polity. First, how much of the 
                                                                                                                 
accepted in federal cases under section 2 may be used in cases arising under the California 
Act. Id. 
  40.   This was so despite explicit district court findings (mentioned earlier in the opinion) 
that race-based campaign appeals had contributed to blacks’ inability to participate in the 
political process. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 40. As I discuss below, such appeals constitute 
important but nonquantitative evidence of racial bloc voting. 
 41.    See id. 
 42.    Id. at 52–53 & n.20. 
 43.    Greiner,  supra note 24, at 116–17. 
  44.   See,  e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 500 (2006) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that proof of racial bloc 
voting “is typically done through regression analyses of past voting records”); see also 
Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1988). A research assistant and I, 
after reviewing the published redistricting opinions listed in Ellen Katz with Margaret 
Aisenbrey, Anna Baldwin, Emma Cheuse & Anna Weisbrodt, Documenting Discrimination 
in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. 
MICH. J. L. REFORM 643 (2006), as well as subsequent cases, were unable to discover any 
instance of a court finding racial bloc voting when the plaintiff did not present evidence from 
ecological regression or extreme case analysis. Note that courts have, for the most part, 
considered a third ecological inference technique, called “King’s EI,” only when it conforms 
with the results of regression and/or extreme case. See, e.g., United States v. City of Euclid, 
580 F. Supp. 2d 584, 598 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 455 
 
numerical focus in Justice Brennan’s discussion of the evidence supporting a 
finding of racial bloc voting penetrated the concept or definition of bloc voting? 
Specifically, could voting be deemed racially polarized when white support rates 
for minority-preferred candidates were in some numerical sense “high,” even if 
these “high” levels were ordinarily insufficient to allow minority candidates of 
choice to succeed?
45 Second, what is the role of causation in the racial bloc voting 
inquiry? I briefly analyze the judiciary’s struggles with each question before 
demonstrating that the answers the courts have proposed place even greater 
pressure on the premises of perfect information and biraciality. I conclude with a 
brief word on anti-essentialism. 
1. Correlations Versus Functionality 
The first question concerns the extent to which racial bloc voting should be 
defined in numerical as opposed to functional terms. Is a certain numerical level of 
white crossover voting (meaning white voter support for minority-preferred 
candidates) so “high” as to be inconsistent with a finding that voting is racially 
polarized, even if that “high” level is insufficient to allow minority-preferred 
candidates to succeed? The following hypothetical demonstrates how this might 
occur. Imagine an at-large system in a 100-person electorate with eighty white and 
twenty minority voters. A high percentage of minorities (80%) regularly support 
minority-preferred candidates, but so do 40% of whites.
46 The 40% white crossover 
vote might seem “high,” implying in some sense merely “mild” polarization, but 
actually, the fact that 60% of whites regularly oppose minority-preferred candidates 
means that the latter will never win an election. The minority-preferred candidates 
regularly receive 32 (.4 * 80) white votes plus 16 (.8 * 20) minority votes, for a 
total of 48, as opposed to the non-minority-preferred candidates, who regularly 
receive 48 (.6 * 80) plus 4 (.2 * 20) minority votes, for a total of 52. Thus, the 
“mild” white bloc voting is sufficient to induce regular defeat of minority-preferred 
candidates. This result obtains despite the fact that minority-preferred candidates 
receive more (in fact, twice as many) votes from whites than they do from 
minorities. 
Prior to Gingles, a debate had raged among expert witnesses concerning 
whether, to be legally relevant, the correlation between voter race and voter choice 
had to exceed numerically defined thresholds.
47 For example, some experts 
testifying on behalf of official defendants had contended that racially correlated 
voting could not be deemed legally significant unless minority voter support rates 
for minority-preferred candidates ordinarily exceeded 80% and corresponding 
white voter support rates ordinarily fell below 20%.
48 Note the biraciality inherent 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45.    See Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own 
Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1726 (2004). 
 46.    See infra note 55 for why I chose 40% white crossover voting as a “high” figure. 
  47.   The early debate is summarized in Grofman, supra note 10, at 209. For evidence of 
its more recent revival, see the standards employed in Jeffrey S. Zax, The Statistical 
Properties and Empirical Performance of Double Regression, 13 POL. ANALYSIS 57, 70–74 
(2005). 
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in such an argument. Lower courts mostly interpreted Justice Brennan’s opinion in 
Gingles as foreclosing reliance on this kind of numerically defined threshold or rule 
of thumb.
49 But some commentators did not,
50 and there are signs that the Supreme 
Court might soon seek to engraft numerically defined thresholds or rules of thumb 
into the definition of racial bloc voting, thus reviving the arguments of pre-Gingles 
defendants’ experts. 
Specifically, in Abrams v. Johnson,
51 the Court deemed as evidence against the 
existence of racial bloc voting a lower court finding that “the average percentage of 
whites voting for black candidates across Georgia ranged from 22% to 38%, and 
the average percentage of blacks voting for white candidates ranged from 20% to 
23%.”
52 And last term, in Bartlett v. Strickland,
53 despite the fact that a stipulation 
had removed the issue of racial bloc voting from the litigation,
54 the oral argument 
was dominated by questions regarding the level of white crossover voting 
consistent with a finding of racial bloc voting, with no inquiries into the success of 
minority-preferred candidates.
55 The subsequent opinion, both by its own 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49.    See, e.g., Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011, 1026–27 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(Gruender, J., concurring); Lewis v. Alamance Cnty., 99 F.3d 600, 613 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Vecinos De Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 989 (1st Cir. 1995); Nipper v. 
Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1533 n.76 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
the required “level of white bloc voting . . . will vary according to local circumstances”); 
Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1123 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“practical matter”); Collins v. City of Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1232, 1240 (4th Cir. 1989); City of 
Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 595, 602–03 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 
U.S. 30, 57 (1985)) (“functional analysis”). There were rare exceptions: Clarke v. City of 
Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807, 816–17 (6th Cir. 1994) (Boggs, J., concurring); Sessions v. Perry, 
298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 484 (E.D. Tex. 2004), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 548 U.S. 399 
(2006). 
 50.    See Pildes, supra note 19, at 1563 (“The Supreme Court has not yet had to specify 
what precise levels of white support for minority-preferred candidates defines the boundary 
between polarized and nonpolarized voting.”). But see id. at 1565–66 (articulating a more 
functional view). 
  51.   521 U.S. 74 (1997). 
 52.    Id. at 92. But see id. (noting supposed substantial success among black and black-
preferred candidates). The Abrams court’s use of figures was odd, as the numbers suggested 
that black voters in that case generally opposed white candidates at a rate of around 80% 
(which, again, seems high) and that, apparently, a majority of white voters rarely if ever 
supported a black-preferred candidate. See, e.g., Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. 
Thompson, 116 F.3d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.) (characterizing this level 
of white support for black candidates as allowing “[n]ot very many” such candidates to 
prevail). These figures were similar to those Justice Brennan appended to his opinion in 
Gingles to support the contention that voting was racially polarized. See Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80–82 (1986) (showing white support rates for black candidates 
ranging from 10%–50% with several values in the 40% region). 
  53.   129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009). 
  54.   The parties had stipulated that the third Gingles prerequisite had been met. Id. at 
1240. 
 55.    See Transcript of Oral Argument, Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) 
(No. 07-689), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/07-689.pdf. There were extensive passages in the oral argument 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 457 
 
language
56 and by its adoption of a bright-line rule regarding the first Gingles 
prerequisite,
57 appeared to signal an inclination to deem racial bloc voting absent if 
the percentage of white voters supporting minority-preferred candidates exceeded 
certain numerical thresholds. Thus, the Supreme Court may be setting the 
foundation for the adoption of a rule (perhaps a rule of thumb) specifying that, for 
example, a 40% white crossover rate (perhaps some kind of “average” rate, 
although it is hard to understand what would be “averaged” here) forecloses a 
finding of racial bloc voting, and/or that a greater-than-20% minority crossover rate 
has the same consequence.
58 
The trend toward a numerical limit or a rule of thumb turning on white 
crossover voting, if such a trend exists, depends on both of the premises identified 
above, the availability of near-perfect information about voting patterns and 
biraciality. Hard, or even presumptive, numerical thresholds cannot tolerate more 
than a scintilla of statistical uncertainty. What would a lower court working under 
such a threshold do when faced with an analysis showing that in a particular 
election, the fraction of Hispanic voters supporting a particular candidate was 95% 
likely to be between .63 and .98?
59 What if relevant intervals were this wide in a 
series of elections? Moreover, what crossover numbers should a court examine in a 
multiracial polity? If, per the city of Boston examples discussed in Part IV, a black 
candidate runs against a white candidate, how does one conceptualize Hispanic 
“crossover,” and what support rate among Hispanic voters would be relevant? 
Further, suppose in a polity (such as the city of Boston) with four nontrivial racial 
                                                                                                                 
transcript. Here is a sample: 
Justice Souter: Well, you don’t suggest that if there were 40 percent white 
crossover voting, we would find white bloc voting within the Gingles 
condition, do you? Do you think that is a serious possibility? 
. . . 
Justice Alito: . . .40 percent . . . . 
. . . 
Justice Scalia: . . . 40 percent crossover is fairly high . . . . 
Id. Chief Justice Roberts later suggested that 11% white crossover voting would be 
inconsistent with a finding that voting was racially polarized. Id.  
    Note that a decade ago, the Ninth Circuit drew a line at 60% white crossover voting. 
See Old Person v. Cooney, 230 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 56.    Strickland, 129 S. Ct. at 1244 (implying that 20% white crossover voting is 
inconsistent with racial bloc voting). 
 57.    Id. at 1246 (justifying a formalist “50%” rule for the first Gingles prerequisite with 
a desire for bright-line rules). 
  58.   Meanwhile, official defendants have revived arguments based on numerical 
thresholds. See, e.g., United States v. City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d 584, 596 (E.D. Ohio 
2008). 
  59.   These are actual figures from the city of Boston for the support rates for Hillary 
Clinton. See infra note 150. Regarding the terms “point estimate” and “interval,” which are 
used throughout this paper: A point estimate may be thought of as a statistical technique’s 
best guess as to the value of some quantity of interest. An interval provides a range within 
which the true value is in some sense “likely” to fall. A commonly used interval is a 95% 
interval, meaning that the interval is (in various philosophical senses that need not concern 
us here) 95% likely to contain the true value. The wider the 95% interval, the less we know 
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groups, whites, Asians,
60 blacks, and Hispanics, all prefer candidates of their own 
race first, but when no candidate from their own group runs, each group’s 
preferences correlate with the combination of candidate races presented (e.g., white 
voters choose the black candidate when a black faces a Hispanic, and so forth). 
Then, it may be that one group’s preferred candidates are consistently shut out of 
the process despite alternately receiving support from each of the other racial 
groups. Averaging in this kind of multiracial, shifting-coalition setting could show 
support rates below any reasonable threshold even though every white voted the 
same as every other white, every black voted the same as every other black, and so 
on (meaning that voting is perfectly racially correlated). 
Finally, matters become more difficult if voting is not in fact racially polarized. 
For technical reasons Kevin Quinn and I have explored elsewhere,
61 the degree of 
separation among racial groups’ voting preferences is related to how precisely 
those preferences can be estimated. In other words, if whites vote differently from 
blacks who vote differently from Hispanics, the confidence intervals for all three 
groups usually narrow. So we have a better idea of how racial groups are voting if 
they have different preferences than we do if they have similar preferences. The 
connection here to allegations of a decrease in white bloc voting behavior is 
obvious, with the ultimate implication being that it becomes hard to distinguish two 
cases: (1) similarity of preferences among racial groups (meaning no racially 
correlated voting), and (2) lack of information about how racial groups are voting 
(meaning little information from estimation techniques currently in use). 
In short, the questions posed in the previous paragraphs have no answers unless 
near-perfect information is available and unless the polity is essentially biracial. If 
these two premises break down, as has already happened, so must a reliance on 
numerical thresholds or rules of thumb. 
2. Causation 
The debate on the role of causation
62 in the racial bloc voting inquiry has 
occurred primarily in the lower courts,
63 which have discussed the issue at great 
                                                                                                                 
 
  60.    On the general viability of a pan-Asian voting bloc, see Christian Collet, Bloc 
Voting, Polarization, and the Panethnic Hypothesis: The Case of Little Saigon, 67 J. POL. 
907 (2005). 
  61.   D. James Greiner & Kevin M. Quinn, R x C Ecological Inference: Bounds, 
Correlations, Flexibility and Transparency of Assumptions, 172 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y (A) 
67, 74–76 (2009). 
 62.    See supra note 26 and accompanying text for the various ways in which the issue of 
causation is phrased in the racial vote dilution context. 
  63.   The Supreme Court has indicated some skepticism of the role of racially caused 
voting in dilution litigation. In League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 
423–47 (2006), for example, the Supreme Court found a section 2 violation in Texas’s mid-
decade congressional re-redistricting without mentioning the concept. See also Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264 (2009) (“[P]roving what ultimately drives the 
electorate to choose a particular candidate is a difficult endeavor, not likely to lend itself to a 
certain conclusion.”). Both League of United Latin Am. Citizens and  Caperton were 
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length. These lower courts have picked up on language in Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion in Gingles endorsing a focus on the reasons for white voter rejection of 
minority-preferred candidates,
64 as well as Justice White’s cryptic Gingles 
concurrence.
65 Here, doctrinally, the lower courts have split on a variety of 
dimensions, including (i) whether evidence proving or refuting that voting is 
racially caused is relevant in vote dilution lawsuits;
66 and (ii) whether, if relevant, 
the inquiry into causation should occur when a court adjudicates the Gingles 
prerequisites
  or the totality-of-circumstances stage.
67 Courts appear to consider 
these doctrinal disputes important for racial bloc voting,
68 but equally important for 
the purposes of this Article is the nature of the evidence upon which courts rely to 
adjudicate causation. Two points are particularly relevant. First, although judges 
have long anticipated that quantitative evidence on causation (in the form of 
                                                                                                                 
 
  64.   Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 100–02 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 65.    Id. at 82–83 (White, J., concurring). 
  66.   Some circuits say such evidence is relevant. Goosby v. Town Bd. Hempstead, 180 
F.3d 476, 493 (2nd Cir. 1999); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Thompson, 116 F.3d 
1194, 1198–1200 (7th Cir. 1997); Lewis v. Alamance County, 99 F.3d 600, 615 n.12 (4th 
Cir. 1996); Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1313 (10th Cir. 1996) (“perhaps”); Vecinos 
De Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 983 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1995); League of United 
Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 856–58 (5th Cir. 1993). Note that Sanchez is 
not 100% clear. One circuit has held that causation is never relevant to vote dilution. United 
States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 912 (9th Cir. 2004); Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 
F.3d 543, 556–58 (9th Cir. 1998). Another circuit has implied, but not held, the same. 
Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1135–38 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
Another circuit has definitively resolved the issue only in a plurality opinion. Nipper v. 
Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1515 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (plurality opinion); see id. at 1547 
(Hatchett, J., dissenting); see also Solomon v. Liberty Cnty. Comm’rs, 221 F.3d 1218, 1225 
(11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Courts in other circuits have found section 2 violations in several 
cases without discussing causation. Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 
2004); Corbett v. Sullivan, 202 F. Supp. 2d 972 (E.D. Mo. 2002); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. 
Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989). But see Jeffers, 730 F. Supp. at 243 (Eisele, C.J., concurring 
and dissenting, filed Jan. 26, 1990). 
  67.   For the position that such evidence is relevant at the prerequisite stage, see League 
of United Latin Am. Citizens, 999 F.2d at 855–59; Barnett v. City of Chicago, 969 F. Supp. 
1359, 1409–11 (N.D. Ill. 1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 141 F.3d 
699 (7th Cir. 1998). For the totality-of-circumstances stage, see Goosby, 180 F.3d at 493; 
Thompson, 116 F.3d at 1199; Lewis, 99 F.3d at 615 n.12; Vecinos De Barrio Uno, 72 F.3d at 
980.  
  68.   If causation is relevant but only at the totality-of-circumstances stage, then section 2 
plaintiffs will encounter the issue after receiving the benefit of a presumption that a party 
who proves the three Gingles prerequisites should ordinarily win the lawsuit. See, e.g., 
Teague v. Attala Cnty., 92 F.3d 283, 293 (5th Cir. 1996); NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 
65 F.3d 1002, 1019 n.21 (2d Cir. 1995); Clark v. Calhoun Cnty., 21 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 
1994); Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1135; United States v. City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d 584 (N.D. 
Ohio 2008). And in fact, cases in which a plaintiff proves the three Gingles prerequisites but 
fails to prevail at the totality-of-circumstances stage appear to be rare. See Katz et al., supra 
note 44, at 660. 
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multivariate modeling) would emerge,
69 none has.
70 This is in contrast to other civil 
rights litigation class action contexts, where acceptance of statistical evidence on 
the existence vel non of causally defined harm is the norm.
71 Second, once a 
plaintiff has proved racially correlated voting, the lower courts have typically 
placed the burden of disproving racial animus as the source of such patterns on the 
official defendant.
72 Legally, this latter choice is hard to justify; none of the 
traditional indicators of an affirmative defense (e.g., defendant’s superior access to 
evidence, statutory language) support this choice. 
In my view, the nonemergence of statistical techniques to tackle causation and 
the placement of the burden of persuasion on the defendant are related in that the 
lower courts appear to recognize implicitly that if they assigned the burden of a 
causation proof to the plaintiff (as is true in other civil rights contexts
73) and took 
that burden seriously, no other issue in vote dilution litigation would be relevant, 
and no plaintiff would prevail. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that a 
focus on causation will continue to preoccupy courts. Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
in Gingles aside, at least one Justice has suggested in another context that statutes 
remedying disparate impact alone may be unconstitutional.
74 
Finally, note that the first step in discerning causation based on quantitative 
evidence would be near-perfect information regarding the voting preferences of 
different racial groups. Discerning what these preferences actually are would seem 
a prerequisite to explaining them. Moreover, any such inquiry will be more difficult 
in a multiracial setting. Thus, the causation issue simmering in the lower courts 
depends on the two premises of near-perfect information and biraciality identified 
above. 
3. A Short Note on Anti-Essentialism 
I pause here to mention briefly the rise of anti-essentialism,
75 a vote dilution 
principle that has not thus far penetrated racial bloc voting doctrine but which may 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69.    Cf. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 904 n.13 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment); League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 999 F.2d at 859–60 (“detailed multivariate 
analysis”); Jones v. City of Lubbock, 730 F.2d 233, 234 (5th Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., 
concurring); Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 433–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
  70.   I argue that pursing a causal inquiry in this context is highly suspect in D. James 
Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 590–97 (2008).  
 71.    See, e.g., id.; see generally RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE 
STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION:  USING  STATISTICAL  EVIDENCE IN DISCRIMINATION  CASES 
(1996). 
 72.    See, e.g., Vecinos De Barrio Uno, 72 F.3d at 983; Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 
1524 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (plurality opinion). Another circuit has flip-flopped. 
Compare  League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 999 F.2d at 855–59 (on plaintiff), with 
Teague, 92 F.3d at 290 (on defendant), and Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 478 n.88 
(E.D. Tex. 2002) (on plaintiff), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. League of United 
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 73.    See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–57 (1981). 
 74.    See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2681–83 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
  75.   For the “essentialism” label, see, for example, SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. 
KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 789 (3d ed. 2007). 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 461 
 
do so soon.
76 The anti-essentialism principle holds that governments may not act on 
the prohibited “assumption” that members of a racial group “‘share the same 
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.’”
77 On at least 
one account, this principle underlies the prohibition, stemming from Shaw v. Reno
78 
and its progeny, against the overuse of race in the districting process.
79 The 
principle also provided the foundation for League of United Latin American 
Citizens v. Perry’s
80 engrafting of a “cultural compactness”
81 requirement into the 
first Gingles prerequisite; the idea here being that minority groups whose members 
are geographically dispersed (perhaps due to sparse population of any kind in the 
relevant area) and characterized by differences in socioeconomic indicia cannot be 
“compact” enough to warrant a judicially imposed single-membered district 
remedy. 
I do not engage further with anti-essentialism because, as noted above, my 
project is to articulate a way forward that is consistent with the legal framework as 
it currently exists, a framework the Court at least says that it is reluctant to 
abandon.
82 The application of anti-essentialism to racial bloc voting results in one 
of two implications. The first is the triumph of theory over facts,
83 i n  t h a t  n o  
amount of actual proof that voters of the same race “‘share the same political 
interests, and . . . prefer the same candidates at the polls’”
84 keeps this idea from 
constituting an “assumption,” and because this idea is an “assumption” and not a 
“fact,” officials may not rely on it when drawing district lines.
85 If that is true, then 
racial bloc voting is always an assumption that can never be proved. The second 
possible implication is that a proof of racially polarized voting will in future cases 
                                                                                                                 
 
 76.    See Pildes, supra note 7, at 1147–48 (predicting that anti-essentialism would lead 
the judiciary toward “a more complex, multivariate approach to defining racial 
polarization”). 
 77.    See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912, 920 (1995) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 
U.S. 630, 647 (1993)). 
  78.   509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 79.    See  Miller, 515 U.S. at 917 (approving a “predominant factor” analysis). For 
another account, see Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre 
Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. 
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993) (interpreting Shaw in terms of expressive harms). 
  80.   548 U.S. 399, 433–35 (2006). 
 81.    Daniel  Ortiz,  Cultural Compactness, 105 MICH.  L.  REV.  FIRST  IMPRESSIONS 48 
(2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/ortiz.pdf. 
  82.   Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1244 (2009).  
 83.    See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 6, at 304. 
  84.   Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 
647 (1993)). 
  85.   One can see this tension at work in League of United Latin American Citizens itself. 
To justify a finding that Latinos in west Texas met the three Gingles prerequisites, Justice 
Kennedy quoted with approval a district court finding that voting was racially polarized 
“throughout the State.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 427–29 
(2006) (quoting Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 492–93 (E.D. Tex. 2002)). A few 
pages later, however, when holding that a borderland-to-Austin district failed to meet the 
first  Gingles prerequisite, Justice Kennedy reduced the idea that voting was racially 
polarized to a “mathematical possibility.” Id. at 435. 462  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
be necessary but not sufficient, with the additional evidence required perhaps 
taking the form of a showing that the relevant racial minority has similar levels of 
income, educational achievement, literacy, and so forth. If so, then the discussion in 
this article, which focuses on information about voting patterns, is still necessary to 
the future of racial bloc voting, but it also may not be sufficient. 
II. THE EMPIRICS OF RACIAL BLOC VOTING 
The previous Part discussed how, beginning with Justice Brennan’s opinion in 
Gingles and continuing to the present, the doctrinal definition of racial bloc voting 
has depended on the twin premises of near-perfect information on racial voting 
patterns and biraciality, with recent trends suggesting still-greater dependency. This 
Part analyzes the empirical challenges these doctrinal moves have created in a 
nation characterized by an increasingly multiracial polity and by allegations of 
reduced white voter polarization. Because courts have focused to such an 
extraordinary extent on ecological inference techniques, I focus some of my 
attention there as well. My purpose in this Part is not to suggest that ecological 
inference should no longer be attempted, nor to catalog every one of the statistical 
shortcomings of the various available techniques.
86 Rather, my purpose is to 
demonstrate that current circumstances, particularly an increasingly melting-pot 
United States polity, now challenge these techniques in new ways. These 
challenges require the use of modern methods, such as the one Kevin Quinn and I 
invented called the GQ Method. But given the inherent shortcomings of ecological 
inference, shortcomings current circumstances are rapidly exposing, we need to 
search for alternative sources of information, a subject I take up in Part III. 
Section II.A provides an intuitive
87 account of how ecological inference works 
and why it is an unusually fragile class of statistical methodology. Section II.B 
provides a similarly intuitive account of why the presence of additional racial 
groups increases the fragility of the ecological inferences. Section II.C shows that 
forcing the construction of a “biracial” polity by dividing potential voters into 
members and nonmembers of the plaintiffs’ group is not a viable solution. Section 
II.D discusses the extent to which modern ecological inference methods can solve 
these problems; as suggested above, the answer is partly, but not completely, and 
not enough over the long term. Section II.E articulates an additional empirical 
challenge unrelated to ecological inference, namely, the potentially decreasing 
amount of information in so-called “exogenous” contests. Section II.F solidifies the 
                                                                                                                 
 
  86.   For a dated but still instructive debate on the pros and cons of ecological inference, 
see the articles in Volume 15 of Evaluation Review, which are primarily dedicated to this 
subject, particularly David A. Freedman, Stephen P. Klein, Jerome Sacks, Charles A. Smyth 
& Charles G. Everett, Ecological Regression and Voting Rights, 15 EVAL. REV. 673 (1991). 
  87.   My discussion throughout this paper sacrifices mathematical rigor to accessibility. 
Readers desiring a more rigorous treatment are referred to the references in the footnotes, 
along with the following, which are listed in increasing order of technical sophistication: 
Bernard Grofman, A Primer on Racial Bloc Voting Analysis, in THE REAL Y2K PROBLEM: 
CENSUS  2000  DATA AND REDISTRICTING  TECHNOLOGY  43 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2000); 
Greiner,  supra note 24; and the collected works in ECOLOGICAL  INFERENCE:  NEW 
METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGIES (Gary King, Ori Rosen & Martin A. Tanner eds., 2004). 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 463 
 
discussion with a short example. Section II.G addresses whether the empirical 
situation with respect to racial bloc voting is unusual in civil rights law. 
A. How Ecological Inference Works (Intuitively) and Why It Is Inherently Fragile 
As noted above, almost all evidence of racial bloc voting to date has come from 
two statistical techniques mentioned in Justice Brennan’s Gingles opinion, called 
“ecological regression” and “homogenous precincts.” Both ecological regression 
and homogenous precincts are examples of a broader class of statistical methods 
called “ecological inference.” As relevant to vote dilution, ecological inference is 
the attempt to glean information about racial voting patterns by examining precinct-
level vote returns together with precinct-level demographic information, typically 
about voting age population (VAP).
88 Thus, for example, we know (from the 
census) the number of (say) African Americans and Caucasians eighteen years or 
older in a precinct, and we know (from vote returns) for any particular election the 
number of votes cast for (say) the Democratic candidate and the Republican 
candidate. What we need to know in order to figure out whether voting is racially 
correlated is the number of African American voters
89 who voted for the Democrat 
and who voted for the Republican, as well as the same figures for Caucasians. 
One can think of information of this kind as coming from two sources, (i) the 
so-called “bounds” within a precinct, and (ii) associations of counts across 
precincts. Regarding the first source, we know that within a particular precinct, we 
cannot have more African Americans voting Democrat than we have either African 
Americans or Democratic votes there. Thus, there are “bounds” for the quantities 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88.    See Greiner, supra note 24, at 121. Note that there is an issue here, potentially 
important in cases involving Hispanic and Asian Americans, regarding whether one should 
use raw population (as is done for one person, one vote purposes), VAP, or citizen-VAP 
(CVAP). See Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, 
Whom to Count, and Where to Count Them, 45 IND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript 
at 18–21) (copy on file with author). Part of the problem is that courts have resolutely 
refused to acknowledge that citizenship information is not part of the basic census form (and 
has not been for some time). Instead, citizenship information used to come from the census 
long form, which was sent to only one-sixth of housing units, and now comes from the 
American Community Survey, which goes to only 2.5% of housing units. The shift to the 
American Community Survey means that the citizenship information available to 
redistricters in the 2010 round will be the results of five-year averaging and (particularly at 
the low levels of geography used in districting) will come with substantial uncertainty (due 
to sampling and modeling) expressed in the form of confidence intervals. Id. at 22–25. 
Again, it is not clear how a bright-line rule of the kind the Bartlett Court appears to favor 
would have any meaning here if courts focus on CVAP. 
    Note that some states, such as South Carolina, do ask for race information when 
voters register. See Grofman, supra note 87, at 21–50. Such information can be combined 
with public records recording who voted to improve ecological inference results. Of course, 
such information also begs a question about whether we should care about actual voters, 
registered voters, eligible voters, or something else. See infra text accompanying note 103. 
  89.    Note that racially correlated voting is usually conceptualized in terms of what 
voters, not potential voters, do. See infra text accompanying note 107. 464  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
we are attempting to estimate. Tighter
90 bounds are better because they mean we 
have more information.
91 Bounds tend to be tighter in precincts that are dominated 
by one racial group; the intuition here is that if one racial group dominates 
(meaning constitutes, say, 90% or more of the precinct’s VAP), then the observed 
vote totals in that precinct can be safely attributed to this racial group alone, as 
there is essentially no one else to speak of in that precinct. For this reason, strongly 
segregated housing patterns are helpful for ecological inference, a point to which I 
return below. 
Regarding the second source of information, associations of counts across 
precincts, the numbers may suggest an association between an increase in a racial 
group’s numbers with an increase in a candidate’s vote totals. For example, the data 
may show that generally, precincts with larger black VAP have higher Democratic 
vote totals. From such a pattern, an ecological inference method attempts to infer 
that blacks are voting Democrat. 
Older ecological inference methods typically use only one of these two sources 
of information. Both of the techniques identified in Justice Brennan’s Gingles 
opinion,
92 “homogenous precincts,”
93 and “ecological regression,”
94 are such 
single-source techniques. The homogenous precincts technique uses information 
only from the first source (the bounds), and because the bounds are usually tight 
only in precincts dominated by one racial group, it uses only these “homogenous” 
precincts.
95 For this reason, this technique must depend on the assumption that, say, 
white voters in all-white precincts support Democrats at exactly the same rate as 
white voters in mixed-race precincts. 
Meanwhile, because ecological regression makes use only of the second source 
of information (associations across precincts), this method can produce physically 
impossible estimates, such as that 115% of Hispanic voters supported the white 
candidate. Without the bounds to constrain the numbers, impossible results can 
(and often do) occur.
96 An important point for the themes of this Article is what 
courts and expert witnesses do in cases in which regression produces impossible 
results. The dominant practice is to change the output of the model to the nearest 
physically feasible number (100% in the example above), argue that the impossible 
                                                                                                                 
 
  90.   “Tighter” here means that the upper bound and the lower bound are closer together, 
so that the interval in which the truth could lie is smaller. 
 91.    See  Otis Dudley Duncan & Beverly Davis, An Alternative to Ecological 
Correlation, 18 AM. SOC. REV. 665, 666 (1953) (“The individual correlation is approximated 
most closely by the least maximum and the greatest minimum among the results for several 
systems of areal subdivision.”). 
 92.    See supra text accompanying note 42. 
  93.   Also known as “extreme case” analysis. 
  94.   Also known as “Goodman” regression, or “BERA,” for “bivariate ecological 
regression analysis.” Note that the “bivariate” in this acronym is a sign of trouble, as the “bi” 
part assumes only two racial groups in the polity. 
 95.    Greiner,  supra note 24, at 126–30. 
  96.   Often, such physically impossible estimates are accompanied by “wonderful 
regression fits,” CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & W. PHILLIPS SHIVELY, CROSS-LEVEL INFERENCE 
74 (1995), corresponding to a high degree of statistical certainty that the “true” value is close 
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number is strong evidence of a high degree of cohesion in the racial group at issue, 
and attribute the anomaly to “sampling variability,” that is, to chance.
97 The last 
claim is made despite small estimated standard errors (if these are provided, which 
they often are not), suggesting that the impossible result is unlikely to be due to 
chance.
98 
Why are ecological inference methods considered so fragile?
99 Few jurisdictions 
have housing patterns so strongly segregated that all (or even most) voters live in 
racially uniform precincts. Suppose the data show that an increasing number of 
Hispanics in precincts is associated with an increasing number of votes for a black 
candidate (running against a white), leading to the conclusion that Hispanics are 
voting for the black candidate. The problem is that we do not know whether it 
really is the Hispanics that are voting for this black candidate. It might be that non-
Hispanics living in heavily Hispanic neighborhoods are more liberal than non-
Hispanics living in non-Hispanic neighborhoods, and that liberals are voting for the 
black candidate. In that case, non-Hispanics effectively fool us by being more 
likely to vote for the black candidate if they live in Hispanic neighborhoods, 
causing the model to “think” that Hispanics are voting for the black candidate 
(when such is not the case).
100 I have encountered this deceptive situation in my 
research.
101 
B. Why Additional Racial Groups Make Matters Difficult 
The previous section explained intuitively how ecological inference techniques 
work as well as why they are so fragile as a general matter; particularly fragile are 
the two techniques Gingles mentioned: homogenous precincts and ecological 
regression. This section shows why these techniques are even more fragile when 
they are applied to multiracial jurisdictions. The general theme here is simple: more 
racial groups mean more moving parts. 
1. Within a Single Precinct 
One way in which additional racial groups make ecological inference more 
difficult is by making it harder for a model to figure out what is happening within a 
particular precinct. To see this, imagine first a precinct that has only three people of 
voting age in it, two white and one black. For a particular election, the secretary of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97.    See Greiner, supra note 24, at 132–33 (documenting the extent of this practice and 
noting a case in which an expert adjusted an estimate of -400% to 0); see also id. app. A 
(listing cases). 
  98.    Unfortunately, it appears that the practice of relying on physically impossible 
estimates produced by regression remains live and well. See, e.g., United States v. City of 
Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d 584, 598 n.17 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
  99.   Well-respected members of the statistical community believe that ecological 
inference should never be attempted. See, e.g., Stephen P. Klein, Jerome Sacks & David A. 
Freedman, Ecological Regression Versus the Secret Ballot, 31 JURIMETRICS J. 393 (1991). 
 100.   See W.S. Robinson, Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals, 15 
AM. SOC. REV. 351 (1950). 
  101.   Greiner & Quinn, supra note 61, at 76. 466  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
state reports that for this precinct, one person voted Democrat and one person voted 
Republican. From that, we can tell that one person did not vote. The question is, 
how many different combinations of voter race/voter choice could give rise to these 
numbers? Three, with the possibilities listed immediately below in chart form. 
 
One Precinct, Two Racial Groups 
  Possible voter-race/voter-choice combinations 
Case 1  black-Dem  white-Rep  white-NoVote 
Case 2  black-Rep  white-Dem  white-NoVote 
Case 3  black-NoVote  white-Dem  white-Rep 
 
Now suppose that there are, again, three people of voting age in a precinct, but 
this time, there is one black, one Hispanic, and one white. As before, the secretary 
of state reports that for this precinct, one person voted Democratic and one voted 
Republican, meaning one person did not vote. How many different voter-
race/voter-choice combinations could give rise to these numbers? Six, and again, 
the possibilities are listed below.  
 
One Precinct, Three Racial Groups   
  Possible voter-race/voter-choice combinations 
Case 1  black-Dem  Hisp-Rep  white-NoVote 
Case 2  black-Dem  Hisp-NoVote  white-Rep 
Case 3  black-Rep  Hisp-Dem  white-NoVote 
Case 4  black-Rep  Hisp-NoVote  white-Dem 
Case 5  black-NoVote  Hisp-Dem  white-Rep 
Case 6  black-NoVote  Hisp-Rep  white-Dem 
 
Note that in this second example, there are the same number of persons and the 
same voting behavior distribution as there were in the first example. The change is 
an additional racial group. But that makes for additional moving pieces, which 
means more and harder work for a statistical model. 
2. Across Precincts 
Another way in which additional racial groups make inference more difficult is 
by making it harder for a model to figure out what is happening across precincts. 
To see why, consider a first set of two precincts, in which there are only two racial 
groups of interest. Information from the Census Bureau and the secretary of state 
suggests that for a particular election, the two precincts’ numbers are as follows: 
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Multiple Precincts, Two Racial Groups 
 Blacks  Whites  Dems  Repubs  NoVote 
Precinct 1     20     25     5     10    30
102 
Precinct 2     35     15    10      5    35 
 
What might a statistical model do with this information? It might “notice” the 
fact that as the number of blacks went up (from 20 in Precinct 1 to 35 in Precinct 
2), so did the number of Democrats (from 5 in Precinct 1 to 10 in Precinct 2). The 
model might then associate these two events to predict that blacks are voting 
Democratic.
103 Notice that here, the model could also associate an decrease in the 
number of whites (from 25 in Precinct 1 to 15 in Precinct 1) with a decrease in the 
number of Republicans (10 in Precinct 1 to 5 in Precinct 2), and guess that whites 
are voting Republican. 
Now consider a second set of two precincts, this one with three racial groups. 
 
Multiple Precincts, Three Racial Groups 
 Blacks  Hispanics  Whites  Dems  Repubs  NoVote 
Precinct 1  10     10    25    5    10    30 
   Precinct 2  17     18    15   10     5    35 
 
Here, a model might still associate a decrease in the number of whites (from 25 
in Precinct 1 to 15 in Precinct 1) with a decrease in the number of Republicans (10 
in Precinct 1 to 5 in Precinct 2), and guess as it did before that whites are voting 
Republican. But with which race should a model associate an increase in the 
number of Democrats from Precinct 1 to Precinct 2? Both blacks and Hispanics 
increased in number from Precinct 1 to Precinct 2, and thus it is now difficult for 
the model to “attribute” the increase in Democratic votes to one race or the other. 
Again, there are more moving pieces. 
3. Other Complications (Especially Housing Patterns and Turnout) 
Other factors commonly (although not necessarily) associated with additional 
racial groups make ecological inference more difficult. Two deserve special 
attention: housing segregation and turnout. As discussed above, the degree of 
segregation in housing patterns critically affects the narrowness of the bounds; the 
more segregated housing patterns, the narrower the bounds, and thus the more 
information available.
104 Speaking generally, housing segregation as between 
African Americans and whites has historically been, and continues to be, greater 
than housing segregation among Hispanics and the other two groups, and as among 
                                                                                                                 
 
  102.   20 + 25 – 5 – 10 = 30. Other “NoVote” values are calculated similarly. 
 103.   See supra text accompanying note 100, regarding the fact that the model does not 
know that the “additional” blacks in Precinct 2 are the ones actually providing the 
“additional” Democratic votes. It could be that white people in Precinct 2, which is more 
heavily populated by minorities, are more liberal and thus lean Democratic more than do the 
white people in Precinct 1. 
 104.   See supra text accompanying note 91. 468  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
Asians and the other three groups, particularly in urban areas.
105 Whatever this 
means for race relations, it makes ecological inference more difficult. Thus, once 
again, three (blacks, whites, and Hispanics) are ordinarily worse than two, four 
(blacks, whites, Hispanics, and Asians) are ordinarily worse than three. 
The critical role of turnout
106 becomes clear when one realizes that in vote 
dilution cases, racial voting patterns have long been analyzed by reference to 
actual, as opposed to potential, voters.
107 To clarify: if there are 100 black citizens 
of voting age in a polity, and in a particular election, 70 do not vote, 25 vote for the 
Democrat, and 5 vote for the Republican, then the relevant figure for bloc voting 
purposes is ordinarily considered to be 83% (25 black votes for the Democrat 
divided by 30 total black votes). With this realization, it is intuitively clear that if a 
group’s turnout is high, it is easier to estimate the behavior of its voters: if more 
people vote, there is more information about the preferences of voters. And it is 
well-known that, in general, turnout among Hispanics and Asians is frequently 
lower than that of whites and African Americans, in part (but not always entirely) 
because of lower citizenship rates among the two former groups.
108 Again, the 
presence of additional racial groups increases the challenge for ecological 
inference.
109 
C. A Non-Solution: Biraciality by Construction 
One might think that if ecological inference techniques ordinarily work less well 
if there are more than two racial groups, we could force the issue by dividing the 
polity into the racial group that is represented by the plaintiffs in the lawsuit versus 
“everyone else.” To do so, we must put aside lawsuits in which members of more 
than one racial group sue, so suppose for now that the plaintiffs are all of one race. 
It appears that many expert witnesses and lower courts have adopted the practice of 
collapsing groups other than the plaintiffs’ into “everyone else,”
110 and the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105.   See, e.g., Barnett v. Daley, 32 F.3d 1196, 1200–01 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 106.   See, e.g., Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels: A Fresh Redistricting Paradigm 
Emerges in New Jersey, 1 ELEC. L.J. 7, 16 n.43 (2002) (noting that low Hispanic turnout 
hindered estimation of Hispanic voting patterns in Page v. Bartels). 
 107.   See Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 703–06 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that 
this “approach is well entrenched in the cases”); Theane Evangelis, Note, The 
Constitutionality of Compensating for Low Minority Voter Turnout in Districting, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 796 (2002) (questioning this practice). 
  108.   For example, according to the Current Population Survey, in the United States in 
2008, 64.8% of non-Hispanic whites of voting age voted, as did 60.8% of blacks. Table 4b: 
Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008, U.S.  CENSUS  BUREAU  (Feb. 
2009), http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting/cps2008.html. The 
corresponding figures for Hispanics and Asians were 31.6% and 32.1%. Id. Using citizen 
voting age population as the denominator, the corresponding figures were white: 73.5%, 
black: 69.7%, Hispanic: 59.4%, Asian: 55.3%. Id. 
  109.   For additional factors affecting precision in estimation, see Greiner & Quinn, supra 
note 61, at 74–76. 
 110.   See, e.g., Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1242 (5th Cir. 1988); 
Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“non-blacks” versus 
“blacks”); Barnett v. City of Chicago, 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1433–34 (N.D. Ill. 1997), aff’d in 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 469 
 
California Voting Rights Act even incorporates collapsing into the definition of 
racially polarized voting.
111 
In general, however, excepting groups of trivial size, collapsing differing racial 
groups into the plaintiffs’ class versus everyone else is unwise, for two principal 
reasons. The first reason goes to liability: to the extent that we assess polarization 
in part by a difference in support rates for particular candidates among the 
plaintiffs’ class and the non-plaintiffs’ class, we risk serious misinformation if the 
non-plaintiffs’ class is a mixture of groups with disparate voting patterns. This was 
a thrust of Part I.B.1, above. The second reason concerns remedy: supposing that 
collapsing into plaintiffs’ versus non-plaintiffs’ groups had allowed us to obtain 
proper estimates for the plaintiffs’ group, we may still need to know something 
about the preferences of each of the groups separately in order to assess the 
viability of a remedy. Even assuming a continued regime in which the only 
available, court-ordered remedy in a vote dilution case is a single-membered, 
majority/minority district,
112 courts must still inquire whether the remedial district 
will “perform” in the sense of providing an opportunity to the plaintiffs’ class to 
elect its candidates of choice. That inquiry often depends on the turnout rates and 
preferences of the disparate nonmembers of the plaintiffs’ class placed in a 
remedial district. 
An example may help to clarify this second reason. To make up for line drawing 
elsewhere, the Tom Delay–engineered mid-decade congressional redistricting plan 
passed by the Texas legislature in 2003 included a new, border-to-Austin 
congressional district that was 55% Hispanic VAP.
113 In early January 2004, a 
three-judge panel found that in this district, “Latino voters will likely control every 
primary and general election outcome.”
114 Not so. In the subsequent 2004 
congressional Democratic primary, Caucasian Lloyd Doggett defeated Latina 
Leticia Hinojosa despite the fact that Doggett lost the Latino vote by over ten 
points. One key to Doggett’s victory was the (comparatively) high turnout of 
African American voters in the primary (relative to both whites and Latinos), who 
overwhelmingly supported him.
115 To have performed as the three-judge panel 
expected, this district needed to have included more Latinos, but how many more 
                                                                                                                 
part and rev’d in part, 141 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998); Meek v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 805 F. 
Supp. 967, 976–77, 989–90 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (“black” versus “non-black” and “Hispanic” 
versus “non-Hispanic”). 
 111.   CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14026(e) (West 2003). 
 112.   See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 113.   See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 444 (2006). 
  114.   Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 504 (E.D. Tex. 2004), aff’d in part and rev’d 
in part sub nom. 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
  115.    The relevant 95% posterior intervals from the GQ Method are as follows. For 
Latino, white, and black voter support rates for Doggett: (.43, .46), (.88, .96), and (.96, .99). 
For Latino, white, and black turnout in this primary, the 95% posterior intervals were (.13, 
.14), (.12, .15), and (.16, .24). Point estimates for all of these quantities were centered at 
approximately the middle of these intervals. All quantities are on the basis of VAP (not 
CVAP). 
   The data for this analysis came from Texas Legislative Council’s website, 
ftp://ftpgis1.tlc.state.tx.us/elections, as well as from a file of precinct-level demographic 
information that the TLC was kind enough to provide via email. The quantitative results 
come from the GQ Model. See infra text accompanying note 120. 470  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
depended on whether the non-Latino population in the additional neighborhoods 
added to the district (as well as those removed) were predominantly white or black. 
D. What Modern Techniques (Including the GQ Method) Can and Cannot Do 
How many of the problems articulated in the previous sections can modern
116 
ecological inference techniques solve? Some, but not all; enough for ecological 
inference methods to handle some challenges, but not enough to allow them to 
serve indefinitely the role they have served in the past, as the primary source of 
evidence regarding racial bloc voting in vote dilution disputes. First, the good 
news: at an important price (discussed below), methods are available that can 
analyze any single-vote
117 electoral contest featuring any number of candidates and 
any number of relevant racial groups.
118 Some of these methods never produce 
physically impossible estimates of voting behavior, and others do so only rarely. 
Some produce legitimate, statistically defensible estimates of uncertainty, allowing 
the formation of valid intervals, and by doing so, they flag for the user situations in 
which no inference is possible (ordinarily by producing extremely wide intervals). 
Two of these methods have been programmed into publicly available freeware in a 
popular statistical programming environment.
119 One of these two, the GQ Model 
referred to above, has been validated pursuant to accepted methods for testing 
statistical software, and it shares all the desirable characteristics identified above. It 
uses both of the sources of information identified in Part II.A (that is, the bounds as 
                                                                                                                 
 
  116.   Regarding a technique called “King’s EI,” see Greiner, supra note 24, at 138–43 
(explaining why extension of this technique to multiracial contexts is uncertain). See infra 
note 119. 
  117.   A particular challenge is whether any method can tackle contests in which each 
voter can cast more than one vote for a group of candidates, that is, contests in an at-large 
election system without slotted seats such as the one used for the Boston City Council. The 
problem is more difficult than it might appear at first blush because there is an additional, 
hard-to-model aspect of voting behavior that we do not observe, namely, the number of votes 
each voter casts. In my view, as demonstrated in Part III, it may be best to retreat to 
simplicity in this situation by using correlation coefficients and other blunt measures. Under 
the present state of statistical development, regression in the at-large setting appears 
especially fraught with peril. The following sources debate another proposal, using 
ecological regression, which is mathematically equivalent to simple correlation coefficients 
but more mysterious in appearance. See Bernard Grofman & Michael Migalski, Estimating 
the Extent of Racially Polarized Voting in Multicandidate Contests, 16 SOC. METHODS & 
RES. 427 (1988); Grofman & Barreto, supra note 21; Jeffrey S. Zax, Comment on 
“Estimating the Extent of Racially Polarized Voting in Multicandidate Contests” by Bernard 
Grofman and Michael Migalski, 31 SOC. METHODS & RES. 75 (2002); Zax, supra note 47. 
  118.   On this point, I do not agree with Grofman & Barreto, supra note 21, at 614 n.14, 
when they assert that no models to analyze so-called “R x C” situations are currently 
available. 
  119.   The statistical environment is called R, available for free download at http://www.r-
project.org. The relevant package names are eiPack and RxCEcolInf. eiPack programs the 
model proposed in Ori Rosen, Wenxin Jiang, Gary King & Martin A. Tanner, Bayesian and 
Frequentist Inference for Ecological Inference: The R x C Case, 55 STATISTICA 
NEERLANDICA 134 (2001). 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 471 
 
well as across-precinct associations). The GQ Model and software have other 
advantages, including the ability to incorporate alternative sources of information, 
such as from exit polls or from prior beliefs; it also corresponds to a theory of 
voting at the level of the individual voter, which potentially makes it easier to 
explain to a lay audience.
120 
The important price to be paid for most of these methods is either time or an 
increase in the level of computational complexity in the analysis. In its current 
incarnation, the GQ Model, for example, takes on the order of two to three hours to 
analyze an election in a jurisdiction the size of a typical congressional district using 
a typical laptop or desktop computer.
121 Regressions, in contrast, can be run in 
seconds. Speed concerns need not be an insurmountable obstacle if an expert uses 
one of the increasing number of computer grids available across the country,
122 
some of which can be accessed at low cost to certain users,
123 that allow her to 
analyze dozens of datasets at once. For example, using the Crimson Grid at the 
Harvard University Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences,
124 analysis of 
fifty statewide datasets as run in Pender and New Hanover Counties in North 
Carolina (the counties at issue in Bartlett v. Strickland)
125 using the GQ Model took 
a couple of days, once the data had been fully formatted. Such grids could be 
necessary if an expert is to produce a report within the time frame of, say, one to 
three weeks.
126 
But one cannot get blood from a turnip. If the numbers have little information, 
ecological inference methods will fail to produce useful estimates. Or, they should 
fail to produce useful estimates. An advantage of most recently developed 
techniques, including the GQ Method, is that they will warn the expert that the data 
have little or no information about a racial group’s preferences in a particular 
election by providing extremely wide intervals for quantities of interest.
127 That is a 
substantial improvement over ecological regression, which can fool the expert into 
thinking that nothing is wrong in such a situation, particularly if she is inclined to 
                                                                                                                 
 
  120.   We proposed the GQ Model in Greiner & Quinn, supra note 61, and programmed it 
with Paul Baines. Computer code to run the model is contained in the R package 
RxCEcolInf, available from the R website, http://www.r-project.org. Regarding software 
validation, we followed the method in Samantha R. Cook, Andrew Gelman & Donald B. 
Rubin,  Validation of Software for Bayesian Models Using Posterior Quantiles, 15 J. 
COMPUTATIONAL & GRAPHICAL STAT. 675 (2006). 
  121.   We are actively pursuing methods to reduce the time needed to run the GQ Model. 
 122.    See, e.g.,  Research Computing Environment,  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  INSTITUTE FOR 
QUANTITATIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE, http://www.iq.harvard.edu/projects/research_computing_environment. 
 123.   See Allison Barker, W.Va. to Launch Public Computing Grid, USA TODAY.COM 
(Oct. 29, 2004), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-10-29-wv-adds-grid_x.htm. 
  124.   Harvard Eng’g & Applied Scis., Office of Info. Tech., The Crimson Grid Initiative @ 
Harvard (Oct. 2, 2005), http://www.gridforum.org/GGF15/presentations/Campus_Sircar.pdf. My 
thanks to Jayanta Sircar and his staff for allowing me to use the Crimson Grid gratis. 
  125.   129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009). 
 126.   See Hirsch, supra note 106, at 13 (“The parties had just 6½ days to prepare for 
trial.”). 
  127.   See the 95% interval for Asian Americans the Deval Patrick election discussed in 
the text following note 150. 472  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
“adjust” physically impossible results to 0% or 100%, whichever is nearest.
128 But 
having discovered that the numbers have little information, we can do little about 
this fact at present.
129 And as the previous parts have detailed, the numbers have 
less information in an increasingly common set of situations. 
E. An Additional Empirical Challenge Not Directly Related to Ecological Inference 
Another fact on the ground, one unrelated to ecological inference, is making 
things harder: the increasing possibility that racial bloc voting exists in a 
jurisdiction with respect to one level of government but not another. 
Bloc voting is ordinarily thought of as a characteristic of the voters in a 
particular area, something that “rarely stops at electoral borders.”
130 For this reason, 
courts routinely consider (but sometimes give reduced weight to) what they call 
“exogenous” elections, that is, elections for offices other than the particular office 
at issue in the litigation (but in the same geographic area).
131 There are growing 
indications, however, that voting can be racially polarized in a single geographical 
area with respect to one level of office but not another. 
The city of Boston provides an example.
132 In 2004, a federal district court 
found that African American plaintiffs had shown that voting in the Massachusetts 
House of Representative districts covering the Boston area was racially 
polarized.
133 Further, no African American candidate won an at-large contest in the 
Boston City Council from 1991 to 2007.
134 In 2006 and 2008, however, African 
American candidates of choice defeated white candidates in the Democratic 
gubernatorial and presidential primaries, winning 59% and 54% of the votes cast, 
respectively.
135 Black, white, and Hispanic voter support rates were quite different, 
but high black voter support for Deval Patrick and Barack Obama overwhelmed 
less than monolithic opposition among white voters and perhaps stronger 
opposition among Hispanics to deliver wins for Patrick and Obama among Boston 
voters.
136 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128.   See supra text accompanying note 98. 
  129.   As mentioned above, efforts are underway to change this situation. See supra note 
25. 
  130.   Black Political Task Force v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 308 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 131.   See, e.g., Askew v. City of Rome, 127 F.3d 1355, 1381 n.13 (11th Cir. 1997); 
Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1209 n.11 (5th 
Cir. 1989); Cano v. Davis, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1235 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (three-judge court). 
  132.   For another example, compare League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 
999 F.2d 831, 837 n.1 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (voting not polarized in Texas trial judge 
elections) with Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 493 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (voting 
polarized “throughout the state” in congressional elections) and Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. 
Supp. 828, 833 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (strong history of polarized voting in Texas). 
 133.   Black Political Task Force, 300 F. Supp. at 300–10. 
  134.   Interview with Kenneth Cooper, Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist, in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts (Aug. 27, 2009) (notes of interview available from author). 
  135.   There is substantial uncertainty associated with these figures. See infra text 
accompanying note 150. 
 136.   See infra notes 150–53 (discussing these figures and the sources for them). Note 
that in implying that voting was not racially polarized in these elections, I am making a 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 473 
 
It is not particularly difficult to articulate how this can happen: turnout and “roll-
off”
137 patterns among racial groups may vary by level of government. For 
example, in Boston, city council contests are held in odd-numbered years, and the 
electorate in municipal elections in Boston has been whiter and more conservative 
than that in statewide elections.
138 What this demonstrates, however, is that less 
monolithic white bloc voting in federal and statewide elections need not (and in 
some cases, does not) translate into similar patterns at other levels of 
government.
139 
If all of this is true, there are at least two implications. First, the judicial practice 
of mining exogenous contests for information about voting patterns has become 
increasingly harder to justify. Second, if exogenous elections provide little (or 
worse, misleading) information in the current era, then we have fewer contests with 
which to assess whether racial bloc voting is present. We need alternative sources 
of information. 
F. An Example 
An example clarifies many of the principles discussed above, particularly the 
difficulties raised by more than two racial groups. Consider the 2006 Democratic 
Massachusetts gubernatorial primary as run in city of Boston precincts. In this 
contest, African American Deval Patrick faced two white candidates, Christopher 
Gabrieli and former Attorney General Thomas F. Reilly.
140 In Boston there are four 
racial groups possibly of interest: African Americans, whites, Hispanics, and 
                                                                                                                 
statement specific to African Americans only. As discussed below, both elections may 
provide evidence that voting was racially polarized with respect to Hispanic voters. Other 
explanations for the Boston phenomenon include leadership style and generational change. 
See R ONALD  SULLIVAN, BARACK  OBAMA AND THE ECLIPSE OF BLACK  CHARISMATIC 
LEADERSHIP (forthcoming) (on file with author) (contrasting the “blackness” of Barack 
Obama to that of “Gray Beards” of the civil rights movement); Kenneth J. Cooper, Young, 
Black, and in the Running, BOS. GLOBE (Sunday Magazine), July 19, 2009. 
  137.   “Roll-off” occurs when voters vote only in high-profile contests at the top of a 
ballot but do not vote in lower-profile state and municipal elections. 
 138.   See, e.g., Eric Moskowitz, Flaherty, Yoon Pin Hopes on New Voters, BOS. GLOBE, 
July 19, 2009, at B1; Donovan Slack & Matt Viser, Turnout at Polls Lowest in Decades: 
Arroyo Loses City Council Seat, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 7, 2007, at A1; Pete Stidman, Arroyo 
Out, Connolly in for At-Large Council; Anemic Turnout Across City, DORCHESTER REP., 
Nov. 8, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.dotnews.com/2007/arroyo-out-connolly-large-
council-anemic-turnout-across-city; Yawu Miller, Early to Rise, BAY ST. BANNER (July 9, 
2009), http://baystatebanner.com/Print?page=local14-2009-04-16; The New Boston Is 
Running. Is It Voting? (WBUR radio broadcast Aug. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.wbur.org/2009/08/21/the-new-boston-is-running-is-it-voting. 
 139.   See Pildes, supra note 19, at 1530–31. 
 140.   In multirace, multiple-candidate, plurality-take-all contests, expert witnesses 
frequently combine candidates of similar race together when attempting to analyze racial 
voting patterns. See, e.g., Barnett v. City of Chicago, 969 F. Supp. 1359, 1424 (N.D. Ill. 
1997). The California Voting Rights Act requires such combinations. CAL.  ELEC.  CODE 
§ 14028(b) (West 2003). I did not follow this practice here in that the GQ Model produced 
figures for all three candidates separately. 474  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
Asians.
141 Meanwhile, recall that the fraction of each race’s voters who supported a 
particular candidate (for instance, Patrick) must lie between 0 and 1. What can 
ecological inference techniques tell us about this election? 
The two techniques identified in Gingles—homogenous precincts and 
regression—both produced plausible results for African Americans and Caucasians. 
This suggested that blacks overwhelmingly supported Patrick, but that whites 
generally preferred one of the other two candidates, with a white voter support rate 
for Patrick of around .30 to just above .40.
142 Notice that if the law included a 
numerical rule focusing on whether the white crossover rate was above .40, as per 
Part I.B.1, it is not clear what a judge would do. 
The real trouble was with the other two racial groups. There were no 
homogenously Hispanic or Asian precincts, rendering homogenous precincts 
analysis unavailable.
143 Regression estimated that the support rates for both 
Gabrieli and Reilly among Hispanic eligible voters
144 were negative, while the 
estimate for Patrick was positive. According to the industry practice,
145 we should 
set the Gabrieli and Reilly support rates to the nearest plausible value, 0, and 
conclude that Hispanic voters overwhelmingly supported Patrick in this primary; at 
a minimum, we should conclude that Hispanics preferred Patrick to the other two 
candidates. As for the support rate for the three candidates as a function of Asian 
VAP, estimates for all three were negative; incidentally, all three estimates were 
also highly statistically significant, suggesting (in a purely statistical sense) a high 
degree of confidence that the true support rates among Asian voters were in fact 
below zero for all three candidates.
146 
The results from the GQ Model were more revealing, both in the substantive 
sense and in the sense of disclosing where trouble lay. The results for blacks and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141.   See  infra Part IV for figures describing the racial composition of the Boston polity. 
  142.   Specifically, the support rate among white voters for Patrick from regression had a 
point estimate of .40 with a standard error of .07. Patrick support rates in the twenty 
precincts that were 95% or more white ranged from .17 to .46, with the median around .3. 
These latter figures are mathematically inconsistent with a critical assumption needed for 
both regression and homogenous precincts, that is, that the Patrick support rate among white 
voters is the same (or nearly so) in all precincts. See Grofman, supra note 87, at 43. With 
respect to African Americans, extreme case analysis and regression agreed that support rates 
among black voters for Patrick were around 90% or higher, although the regression produced 
a large standard error (.15). 
  143.   The most Hispanic precinct in Boston had a Hispanic VAP on the order of 60%; for 
Asians, the corresponding figure was around 50%. See BOS. REDEVELOPMENT AUTH., NO. 
548B (REVISED),  BOSTON’S  VOTING  POPULATION—2000 (2002), available at 
http://www.bostonredevelopmentauthority.org/PDF/ResearchPublications/pdr_548b.pdf 
(providing raw data used by the author to arrive at these percentages). 
  144.   These regressions of percentage of votes for a particular candidate on eligible voters 
are the building blocks for the estimates for actual voters in what experts have labeled the 
“double regression” technique. See, e.g., Grofman & Barreto, supra note 21, at 600. 
 145.   See supra text accompanying note 98. 
  146.   Estimated support rates as a function of Asian VAP for Gabrieli, Patrick, and Reilly 
were -.13, -.15, and -.10, respectively. The corresponding statistics had absolute values of 
6.6, 3.1, and 4.2, respectively. 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 475 
 
whites were roughly similar to those stated above,
147 but the GQ Model provided 
some evidence that Hispanic voters generally opposed Patrick (in contrast to the 
overwhelming support “estimated” by regression), although the results were not 
conclusive. The point estimate for the Patrick support rate among Hispanic voters 
was .22 (in contrast to a point estimate of .59 for Reilly). Taking into account 
uncertainty reveals a more complicated picture. On the one hand, the 95% interval 
for the Hispanic voter support rate for Patrick was (.00, .78), which is wide.
148 On 
the other hand, the GQ Model estimated an 80% probability that the majority of 
Hispanics voters preferred someone other than Patrick.
149 Thus, intervals are wide, 
but at a minimum, they suggest that it is unlikely that Hispanics overwhelmingly 
supported Patrick, the conclusion that ecological regression (as currently used) 
would have us reach. In fact, we have some evidence that Hispanic voters actually 
preferred someone else (probably Reilly). That Hispanic voters, in contrast to the 
estimates from regression, might have opposed a black candidate in the Democratic 
primary is consistent with results estimated from other recent contests in the city of 
Boston, including the 2008 presidential primary,
150 as well as elsewhere around the 
nation.
151 Finally, for Asian voters, the GQ Model estimated a 95% interval for the 
Patrick support rate of (.01, .99). Remembering that the support rate had to be 
between 0 and 1, this is not helpful. 
Why were the estimates for Hispanics and Asians so uncertain? There were four 
racial groups. Hispanics and Asians in Boston have (relative to whites and blacks) 
somewhat scattered housing patterns, so there were no homogenously Hispanic or 
Asian precincts. Further, turnout for both groups (as a function of VAP) was lower, 
at best about one-quarter of the turnout rate for blacks (which roughly equaled that 
of whites).
152 In short, all the factors identified above were present, making trouble 
likely. 
                                                                                                                 
 
  147.   The 95% posterior intervals for Patrick support rates among black and white voters 
were (.93, .95) and (.42, .44), respectively. See text accompanying note 142 for the figures 
from the other techniques. 
  148.   This is an example of Bayesian inference. The GQ Model begins with a mild prior 
belief that candidate support rates for each race’s voters are all 50-50 (in a two-candidate 
contest) or 1/3-1/3-1/3 (in a three-candidate field). By “very mild prior,” I mean that the GQ 
Model begins with a high degree of uncertainty about these beliefs; doing so allows the data 
to dominate. The question, then, is whether the data usefully “update” this belief. Here, they 
do so by placing 80% of the posterior distribution (which is a mathematical combination of 
the prior belief and the data) for the Hispanic support rate for Patrick below .5. For an 
explanation of this terminology, see D.H. Kaye, What Is Bayesianism? A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 161 (1988). 
  149.    More technically, the 80% quantile in the posterior distribution for the Patrick 
support rate among Hispanic voters was approximately .5. The posterior distribution was 
asymmetric. 
  150.    In the 2008 Democratic presidential primary, the GQ Model estimated that the 
Hispanic voter support rate for Obama was .12, with a 95% interval of (.02, .37). 
 151.   See, e.g., Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 478 (E.D. Tex. 2004), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. League of Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
  152.  The 95% intervals for black, white, Hispanic, and Asian turnout were (.24, .27), 
(.21, .22), (.00, .06), and (.00, .04), respectively. 476  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
What did we learn from this exercise? First, some current settings, particularly 
those involving more than two racial groups, require the use of modern ecological 
inference techniques, such as the GQ Method, to produce useful information 
regarding racial voting patterns. As a corollary, the practice among expert 
witnesses of “adjusting” physically impossible figures to 0 or 1, whichever is 
closer, must be abandoned, and courts should no longer tolerate it. Here, that 
practice would have produced not just a statistically indefensible result but what is 
probably the wrong answer for Hispanics. Second, we must have honest estimates 
of uncertainty, and also keep a firm eye on the fact that statistical uncertainty in the 
racial bloc voting context involves a nuanced inquiry into more than evidence of a 
difference in the behavior of racial groups that is unlikely to be due to chance. In 
the Deval Patrick example above, there was strong evidence that Hispanics voted 
for Patrick at a rate lower than did blacks,
153 and there was evidence that Hispanics 
in fact preferred Reilly to Patrick, but the uncertainty in the estimation cautioned 
against overreliance on the latter conclusion. Third, even the best ecological 
inference techniques currently available fail to provide useful information on some 
racial groups of interest in some settings. At present, for Asian Bostonians, housing 
patterns are insufficiently segregated, and both raw numbers and turnout are too 
low, for ecological inference models to say much that is helpful. 
G. Is This Unusual? 
A question naturally arises: are the estimates produced by ecological inference 
with respect to racial bloc voting qualitatively worse than estimates produced by 
statistics in other areas of civil rights law? After all, courts are accustomed to 
relying on second- or third-best statistical techniques (indeed, empirical methods 
generally) in the hope of gleaning some evidence on important questions that must 
be decided within the framework and time limits of a lawsuit.
154 Is the current 
situation qualitatively different? 
Yes, for two reasons. First, the models themselves are crying uncle.
155 As 
demonstrated immediately above in the discussion of the Deval Patrick primary, 
the older models are producing impossible results that, even if “adjusted” to the 
physically possible, are misleading. The modern models are doing what they should 
do, which is telling us that they can say nothing useful with respect to some racial 
groups. If we are to trust statistical techniques when they purport to tell us 
something useful, we ought to trust them when they tell us that they cannot tell us 
anything useful. Second, I believe we can do better by incorporating alternative 
sources of information; that is the subject of Part III. 
                                                                                                                 
 
  153.   Again, the GQ Model estimated a 95% interval for the black and Hispanic support 
rates for Patrick at (.93, .95) and (.00, .78), respectively. Non-overlapping intervals are 
strong evidence of difference. 
 154.   See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 860 (5th Cir. 
1993) (en banc). 
 155.   Cry Uncle—Idioms, FREE DICTIONARY (2010), http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/ 
cry+uncle (“to admit defeat”). 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 477 
 
III. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS 
Can we litigate well (or well enough) the issue of racial bloc voting without 
primary reliance on ecological inference techniques? Yes, although this may be an 
instance of accepting second- or third-best outcomes. There are different prices to 
pay depending on the choices made. At a minimum, proof of racial bloc voting 
requires transformation so that the standard package becomes a mix of ecological 
inference methods, surveys, and a healthy dose of nonquantitative evidence. Even 
so, in some jurisdictions, the needed information may not be available, in which 
case the party with the burden of “proving” or “disproving” racial bloc voting will 
simply lose.
156 Whether the needed information is available must be determined on 
a case-by-case basis, but before concluding that we can say nothing, we should 
examine all possible sources of information. 
I proceed in two Parts. First, I propose definitions of racially correlated and 
racially polarized voting, definitions that can fit within the Gingles framework and 
that are consistent with much (nothing could be consistent with all) of the case law 
in this area. Second, I discuss alternatives, both quantitative and otherwise, to 
ecological inference techniques as a source of evidence of racial bloc voting: 
surveys and nonquantitative evidence, specifically. I also discuss costs. 
A. A Proposed Definition of Racial Bloc Voting 
1. What Is Racially Correlated Voting in a Multiracial Polity? 
I take as axiomatic that there cannot be racial bloc voting unless there is racially 
correlated voting. Thus, to define racial bloc voting in a multiracial polity, we need 
to begin by defining racially correlated voting in a multiracial polity. The primary 
challenge here is not conceptual (as some commentators have suggested)
157 but 
empirical. On the conceptual/definition side, we might think of racially correlated 
voting among more than two racial groups as occurring when each group has a 
distinctive set of preferences that tend to repeat over time, preferences taking the 
form of an ordering of the races of each group’s preferred candidates. For example, 
white voters, say, tend to prefer white candidates, then Hispanic candidates, then 
black candidates (or some other ordering). One might expect that if such tendencies 
exist, members of each racial group would tend to place candidates of their own 
race first. Racially correlated voting is thus defined as patterns that (1) within a 
group, are reasonably stable over time, and (2) among groups, are different.
158 
Implicit in this definition is the fact that contests featuring candidates of a single 
race provide little information on whether voting is racially correlated because they 
                                                                                                                 
 
 156.   I  place “proving” in quotes to clarify that the proof may occur in a court proceeding 
under either section 2 or section 5 (in the latter setting, the burden of disproving bloc voting 
may be on the state), in an administrative proceeding (USDOJ preclearance under section 5), 
or in the hustle of redistricting by state officials following a decennial census. 
 157.   See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 19, at 1372. 
  158.   For purposes of defining racially correlated voting, if two groups’ racial preferences 
match, then one might consider deeming them a single group for purposes of racially 
correlated voting. 478  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
tell us nothing regarding a preference ordering tied to candidate race. Some might 
find this unfortunate, and certainly in an ideal world, matters would be different. 
Nevertheless, League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry suggests that the 
Supreme Court deems it plausible that single-race contests have little information 
on racial bloc voting.
159 Moreover, a purpose of this Article is to introduce 
pragmatism to this sort of debate. In a multiracial polity, we often will not have the 
data needed to analyze voting patterns without heavy reliance on candidate race.
160 
This definition also makes clear the empirical challenge we face even assuming 
a willingness to rely heavily on candidate race, and even if voting behavior were 
directly observable (that is, assuming away the secret ballot). There may be an 
unfortunate sparseness of contests involving the combinations of candidate races 
we need to draw inferences about preference orderings. For example, even limiting 
ourselves to two-candidate contests, in a jurisdiction with four relevant racial 
groups, there are six race-pair combinations. On the bright side, the preference 
ordering hypothesized in this subpart may not need to be strict to be legally 
relevant, and we may not need a full preference ordering for every racial group in a 
polity. For example, white voters may vote en masse for white candidates, but 
when faced with a series of contests featuring Hispanic versus black candidates, 
white voters may switch back and forth in their preferences, or they might divide. 
To see whether this kind of correlation can constitute part of a vote dilution injury, 
we need a definition of racial bloc voting. 
2. What Is Racial Bloc Voting in a Multiracial Polity? 
I propose the following definition of racial bloc voting: a plaintiff proves that 
voting is racially polarized when she shows that voting in a jurisdiction is racially 
correlated, that the candidates of choice of a politically cohesive racial minority 
group have ordinarily lost in the past, and that these patterns are likely to continue 
for the foreseeable future. This definition has three primary features: its explicit 
focus on the future, its avoidance of reliance on numerically defined thresholds or 
rules of thumb, and its straddling of the issue of causation. I briefly discuss each in 
turn. 
At this point, however, I reemphasize that the precise definition of racial bloc 
voting that courts employ matters less, perhaps far less, than the evidence courts 
accept as sufficient to discharge a burden of proof. As discussed above in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159.   In  League of United Latin American Citizens, the Supreme Court affirmed as not 
clearly erroneous a district court finding that Martin Frost, a long-serving white Democratic 
congressman, was not the candidate of choice among African Americans because he had, 
allegedly, never faced a black-preferred opponent (although he had faced, and previously 
lost to, a black opponent), and because the district was drawn for a white Democrat. 548 
U.S. 399, 443–47 (2006). It is hard to imagine the Supreme Court affirming this finding had 
Congressman Frost been black. 
  160.   Even Justice Brennan, who argued strenuously early in his Gingles opinion that 
candidate race meant nothing in the racial bloc voting context, later appeared to concede the 
importance of candidate race when he appended to his opinion tables of estimated support 
rates among North Carolina black and white voters for contests involving black candidates, 
excluding white-on-white contests. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80–82 (1986). 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 479 
 
context of causation,
161 courts have nominally imposed burdens in this area that 
they have not taken seriously. Thus, I provide the proposed definition out of a 
desire to provide a theoretically coherent structure, but perhaps one might get by 
without such a structure,
162 so long as all understand the nature of the evidence 
upon which courts are to rely in adjudicating cases. 
a. Focusing on the Future
163 
A primary difference between my proposed definition and those formally 
articulated in previous judicial opinions is my proposed definition’s explicit focus 
on the future. In my view, this is a matter of candor. True, certain members of the 
judiciary, particularly Justice Kennedy, have reacted with consternation when 
confronting the abstract concept of predicting how members of different racial 
groups are likely to vote in the future,
164 but this consternation conflicts with what 
courts are actually doing and saying when they discuss facts. Among other things, 
the fact that the only relief courts award in such cases is forward looking
165 
compels a focus on the future. It is unsurprising, then, that section 2 opinions, 
including at least one by Justice Kennedy, are replete with forward-looking 
language.
166 
                                                                                                                 
 
 161.   See supra Part I.B.2. 
  162.   The Supreme Court may be attempting to do without coherence in the vote dilution 
area generally. See Gerken, supra note 13, at 1736 (“muddling through”). 
  163.   The focus on the future, as well as the fact that racial bloc voting is not the only 
thing a section 2 plaintiff must prove to obtain relief, demonstrates that my proposal does not 
result in equating “mere . . . political defeat at the polls” with a vote dilution violation. 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971). Compare Whitcomb, 403 U.S. 124 (rejecting 
a vote dilution challenge on the ground that the plaintiffs’ lack of electoral success was mere 
political defeat), with White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (upholding a vote dilution 
finding on the ground that something more pernicious than mere political defeat was afoot). 
  164.   Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1244–45 (2009). 
  165.   When dismantling an at-large system of districts, courts change the structure of 
government for the foreseeable future, and when remedying illegal gerrymandering of a 
single-member districting scheme, courts contemplate that the new set of districts will 
remain in place until the next census. Only rarely do courts revisit the change in the structure 
of government once made. When ruling in favor of section 2 plaintiffs, courts do not upset 
the results of pre-lawsuit elections on the grounds that such elections were held under an 
illegal electoral system, nor do they invalidate laws passed by the illegally constituted 
legislatures, nor do they prevent representatives sitting as a result of the illegal electoral 
system from enacting new laws, nor do they cut existing terms short, nor do they invalidate 
the current system for the next election cycle only (and allow the pre-lawsuit system to be 
used for the subsequent election unless the plaintiff reproves her case). In other words, relief 
in this area is entirely forward-looking.  
 166.   See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 442 (plurality 
opinion) (Kennedy, J.) (castigating the district court and the Chief Justice for their allegedly 
myopic focus on “how effective [a district] ‘had been,’ not on how it would operate today, a 
significant distinction given the growing Latino political power in the district”). “[T]oday” 
must refer to something like “the current era” or “the foreseeable future.” For additional 
forward-looking language, see, for example, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986) 
(“usual predictability”); id. at 99–100 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[S]ubstantial minority 480  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
b. Rejecting Numerically Defined Thresholds 
The definition above omits any reference to a particular threshold of “white” or 
“majority” crossover voting inconsistent with a finding of polarized voting, a la 
Abrams and Bartlett.
167 That is because in the current era, in many polities, there 
may be no “white” or even any single, identifiable “majority” bloc. Rather, there 
may be a system of (potentially shifting and temporary) coalitions among different 
racial groups that consistently leaves one racial group’s candidates on the short end 
of the stick.
168 
Finally, given the majority- or plurality-wins system in place in most United 
States jurisdictions, if it can be shown that a cohesive minority’s candidates of 
choice consistently lose, it must be because nonmembers of this cohesive minority 
(perhaps in various shifting, but still racially identifiable, combinations) are 
consistently voting for someone else. Stated another way, if crossover voting by 
voters outside the plaintiff’s class is sufficient to allow class-preferred candidates a 
reasonable chance of prevailing, then over time a court should see some successes 
by the plaintiff group’s candidates, an easily observed event that the court would 
have to examine anyway. Thus, a separate requirement that a “white” or “majority” 
bloc consistently defeat the cohesive minority’s preferred candidates adds nothing 
to the calculus. 
c. Straddling Causation 
The forward-looking definition I propose straddles the issue of whether a 
plaintiff must prove racially caused voting or merely racially correlated voting to 
succeed. By requiring the defeat of the minority’s candidates of choice to be likely 
in the foreseeable future, causation can be relevant but not dispositive. If courts 
believe that they can discern whether racial animus in the electorate is causing 
voting patterns resulting in the defeat of a plaintiff group’s candidates,
169 then, as 
                                                                                                                 
success will be highly infrequent.”); id. at 100 (“will consistently defeat”); id. (“future 
elections”); see also Vecinos De Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 989 (1st Cir. 
1995) (“rapidly changing political environment”); New Rochelle Voter Def. Fund v. City of 
New Rochelle, 308 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“A reapportionment is not just 
for today.”); Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“reasonable 
projections”). 
 167.   See supra text accompanying notes 51–55. 
 168.   See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley & David Lublin, Drawing Effective 
Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 1383, 1391 (2001) (“[B]lack population percentages of even less than 50% might be 
adequate to elect black Democratic candidates if there was also a substantial Hispanic 
component to the district.”). Note that the shifting nature of racial coalitions and competition 
in multiple-race polities is illustrated well by comparing Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 
908 F.2d 1540, 1545–46 (11th Cir. 1990), in which white voters allegedly took advantage of 
hostility between blacks and Hispanics, with Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 
1246–47 (5th Cir. 1988), in which blacks and Hispanics allegedly voted cohesively in 
opposition to white preferences. 
  169.   For the reasons behind my skepticism on this point, see Greiner, supra note 70. 
Note that highly relevant evidence on “causation” may not be subject to discovery. See Perry 
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Justice O’Connor recognized in Gingles,
170 such a conclusion would speak to the 
minority’s future prospects for electoral success. But if a court observes a persistent 
pattern of losses of the candidates of choice of the plaintiff’s class, it might infer 
that such a pattern is reasonably likely to continue unless it intervenes, even in the 
absence of complete information about why this pattern occurs. 
B. Alternative Forms of Evidence 
Suppose, then, that courts adopt some definition of racial bloc voting that 
includes an inquiry into whether voting has been racially correlated in the past plus 
some additional requirement, such as my proposal of a forward-looking focus on 
likely success of minority-preferred candidates, or perhaps a less-than-serious focus 
on causation.
171 How can parties litigate, and courts decide, whether the standard 
has been met in a world in which, due to the presence of multiple racial groups and 
the possibility of less monolithic white bloc voting, ecological inference techniques 
may not tell us all we need to know? In my view, there are several alternative 
sources of evidence, some quantitative, some not. 
1. Alternative Quantitative Evidence 
Why do so few
172 section 2 cases feature the primary empirical technique that 
politicians, the academy, the media, and thus the general public use to gain 
knowledge about voting patterns by race (or other characteristic), that is, the sample 
survey? Surveys have three primary drawbacks. First, they cannot go backwards 
very far in time,
173 and under most conceptualizations of racial bloc voting 
(including my proposed forward-looking definition) a plaintiff must establish 
patterns over some time period.
174 Second, polls can be expensive. Third, current 
circumstances, particularly the advent of so-called “convenience voting” and the 
increasing prevalence of cell phones, have lowered response rates, raising the 
possibility that survey results might be challenged on Daubert grounds.
175 Note that 
a fourth potential issue with surveys, the so-called Bradley or Wilder effect in 
                                                                                                                 
 
  170.   Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 100 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 171.   See supra Part I.B.2. 
  172.   Of the small number of courts to have considered survey evidence, a few have 
reacted favorably, while others have been more skeptical. Greiner, supra note 24, at 120 n.21 
(collecting cases). 
  173.   The problems involved in retrospective political surveys going back any substantial 
period of time are numerous; for example, once a winner is announced, bias becomes an 
issue in electoral surveys. See, e.g., Lonna Rae Atkeson, “Sure, I Voted for the Winner!”: 
Overreport of the Primary Vote for the Party Nominee in the National Election Studies, 21 
POL. BEHAV. 197 (1999). 
 174.   Gingles upheld a finding of vote dilution based on quantitative data covering three 
election cycles, a period representing six years. 478 U.S. at 80. Lower courts have 
sometimes demanded evidence going further back. See, e.g., Lewis v. Alamance Cnty., 99 
F.3d 600, 605–06 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 175.   See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (establishing the district 
judge as a gatekeeper for scientific or expert evidence under an “assist the trier of fact” 
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which white respondents overstate their level of support for candidates of minority 
race so as to avoid appearing racist, appears to be less of a problem now than it 
used to be.
176 
My points here are that the drawbacks identified above, while real, should be 
thought of as costs, not insurmountable burdens; that, as detailed in Part II, 
ecological inference has costs in terms of fragility of its inferences (always present) 
and, increasingly, an inability to provide useful information; that steps can be taken 
to reduce the costs associated with surveys; and that it may be worth paying these 
reduced costs to obtain needed evidence, particularly when ecological inference 
breaks down. In an effort to assess how high these costs are, I experimented with 
survey methods in the city of Boston. In 2008, I organized a group of three 
academics and recruited over four hundred college and graduate students from 
eleven Boston-area colleges and universities to conduct an exit poll in the city of 
Boston covering the presidential contest as well as three ballot initiatives. In 2009, I 
organized a group of academics that ran a telephone survey of likely city of Boston 
voters in the 2009 city council contests.
177 The discussion that follows is thus based 
on my experiences in this area as well as on what for academics is the more 
traditional source of information, that is, reading about what someone else has 
done. I draw the following conclusions. 
First, to make polling results part of an evidentiary showing for a court, a 
litigator must understand that her role may extend beyond packaging and 
presenting evidence gathered by others to organizing a fact-finding effort (such as a 
set of surveys) and that this process may require a time investment. In particular, 
when ecological inference methods produce inconclusive evidence of racial bloc 
voting, a litigator may need to implement
178 or commission a series of polls over 
more than one election cycle, potentially requiring that a lawsuit be delayed until 
polls are taken and the results known. Thus, major costs to this course of action are 
time and expense.
179 There is little to be done about the time; the need for polls 
over several election cycles may be a fact of life in some multiracial polities. But 
expense can be partially addressed. One way to do so is to find partners to share 
costs, particularly in academia or the media. On the former, my experience in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176.   See Daniel J. Hopkins, No More Wilder Effect, Never a Whitman Effect: When and 
Why Polls Mislead About Black and Female Candidates, 71 J. POL. 769 (2008). 
 177.   See Steven Ansolabehere, Rachael Cobb & D. James Greiner, City of Boston 2009 
Telephone Survey (fielded Oct. 30 to Nov. 3) (data on file with author). 
  178.   A potential issue here is preventing the need for a lawyer to testify in the ensuing 
litigation. See M ODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2010). Although I bracket this 
issue for the purposes of this article, this problem seems manageable. Polls are multiperson 
operations. 
  179.   Some might phrase this concern in terms of an undue burden on the minority group 
whose members might bring a section 2 action, the idea being that these plaintiffs would 
have to suffer under an illegal districting scheme until poll results are known. In my view, 
this is the flipside of the argument made the year after Gingles was decided, see ABIGAIL M. 
THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 
240–44 (1987), and now repeated given the election of President Obama, that we no longer 
need vote dilution law. Both arguments assume that there are, or are not, vote dilution 
problems prior to the determination that there is, or is not, racial bloc voting. 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 483 
 
recruiting students (perhaps “encouraged” by their professors) to administer an exit 
poll suggests that such partnerships can be readily formed. Similarly, the telephone 
survey I organized began with an easily formed partnership among four professors. 
Gaining information useful for a racial bloc voting inquiry involves asking only a 
handful of survey questions (race/ethnicity, which virtually any poll would ask, 
along with voter choices on extant contests), leaving survey space free for other 
partners to explore topics of interest.
180 
Second, not all polls are alike in expense and effort required; again, tradeoffs are 
involved. While they can be the most accurate information-gathering device 
available (depending on a jurisdiction’s rules regarding convenience voting), exit 
polls involve substantial startup costs or, if a polling firm is hired, can be 
expensive,
181 and they are not an option in vote-by-mail jurisdictions.
182 Telephone 
surveys are easier and cheaper, and they require less advanced planning, allowing a 
decision on whether to poll to be made after the candidates for relevant contests 
become clear (so that, for example, investment need not be made if the only 
contests in a particular year are unlikely to produce much useful information).
183 
Moreover, due to the increasing availability of commercial databases detailing 
demographic information on past voters,
184 telephone surveys can be targeted to 
members of particular racial groups.
185 
Third, the results of reasonably well-executed telephone surveys or exit polls 
should not be excluded from evidence on Daubert grounds.
186 True, surveys have 
their methodological challenges. Exit polls typically have on the order of fifty 
percent response rates.
187 Pre-election telephone surveys cannot identify actual 
voters, so assumptions (sometimes strong assumptions) must be made regarding the 
relationship between survey respondents and the electorate,
188 and care must be 
                                                                                                                 
 
  180.   Regarding media partners, see, e.g., David A. Freedman, Stephen P. Klein, Jerome 
Sacks, Charles A. Smyth & Charles G. Everett, Ecological Regression and Voting Rights, 15 
EVALUATION REV. 673 (1991) (discussing results of polls commissioned by the Los Angeles 
Times). 
  181.   Our own exit poll had a budget of over $30,000, although we might have been able 
to get by with less had we been forced to do so. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
  182.   Currently, Washington and Oregon either require or allow voting by mail. 
  183.   This might be true because all of the contests in a particular year are predicted to be 
landslides or because all contests are between candidates of the same race. 
  184.   Our Boston telephone survey targeted and reached approximately 150 likely voters 
from each of the four major racial groups in the city of Boston, namely, African Americans, 
whites, Hispanics, and Asians. 
 185.   See supra note 184. 
  186.   For an exhaustive discussion of Daubert and its progeny in a variety of scientific 
and quantitative settings, see JOHN M. CONLEY & JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC 
AND EXPERT EVIDENCE (2007). 
  187.   Our 2008 exit poll achieved a 57% response rate. See Greiner & Quinn, supra note 
25. 
  188.   Often, pre-election telephone surveys rely on lists of voters in previous contests (as 
matched to telephone numbers and demographic information available from commercial 
sources). Persons who answer the telephone calls are then asked screening questions 
designed to measure the likelihood that they will actually vote in the upcoming election. 
Such questions include the respondent’s personal assessment of her likelihood of voting (in 484  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
taken to address the tendency among survey respondents to overreport voting 
behavior.
189 Cell phones, which make locating residents of a jurisdiction by 
telephone exchange more difficult, constitute an additional challenge, although a 
challenge that new, commercially available databases linking voters’ names, 
addresses, racial information, and telephone numbers are making less important. 
Nevertheless, in exit polls, statistical techniques (such as weighting for 
nonresponse and multiple imputation)
190 can address many of these issues. And in 
most surveys, including both telephone surveys and exit polls, projected results 
from the survey that incorporate nonresponse or weighting techniques can be 
compared to actual vote tallies to assess survey representativeness and to allow for 
adjustments. 
More fundamentally, telephone surveys and exit polls are standard now in the 
industry of assessing and electing candidates. And one should compare the 
reliability of polls, not to a hypothetical perfect sample survey with 100% response, 
but to the reliability of the evidence upon which vote dilution cases have relied for 
decades, that is, the results of the fragile ecological inference methods discussed in 
Part II. Surveys do not encounter the problems discussed in Parts II.A and II.B. 
Reasonable (but imperfect) surveys should thus be compared to fragile ecological 
inference. Poorly executed surveys, like poorly executed ecological inference 
analyses, should be excluded or given little evidentiary weight, but there is little 
new in this realization. 
2. Alternative (Nonquantitative) Sources of Evidence 
As courts have adjudicated whether voting is racially correlated or even caused, 
one might have thought that the presence of observable race-based campaign 
appeals (particularly by successful candidates),
191 a factor listed in the Senate 
Report,
192 would have been highlighted as useful evidence. It is at least plausible 
that race-based appeals constitute not just revealed predictions by candidates 
(whose job it is to be knowledgeable about such things) as to the electorate’s 
preexisting preferences but also a means by which candidates attempt to shape 
those preferences to racially specific voting patterns inuring to the candidates’ 
benefit. Similarly, another Senate Report factor, governmental unresponsiveness to 
minority issues and concerns, suggests a conclusion among elected officials that 
they can ignore the views of minority voters without jeopardizing their prospects 
for reelection, which would ordinarily be true only if voting is racially polarized. 
Yet, I was unable to find a post-Gingles published case in which either race-based 
                                                                                                                 
which case surveyors will “count” answers only from a respondent reporting a high 
likelihood that she will vote) and whether the respondent can identify her polling location. 
 189.   See, e.g., Robert F. Belli, Michael W. Traugott, Margaret Young & Katherine A. 
McGonagle, Reducing Vote Overreporting in Surveys: Social Desirability, Memory Failure, 
and Source Monitoring, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 90 (1999). 
 190.   See  generally  DONALD  B.  RUBIN,  MULTIPLE  IMPUTATION FOR NONRESPONSE IN 
SURVEYS (1987). For an example of the use of multiple imputation in exit polling, taking 
advantage of observed characteristics of voters, see Greiner & Quinn, supra note 25. 
 191.   See Katz et al., supra note 44, for a description of the various forms race-based 
appeals have taken. 
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campaign appeals or lack of governmental responsiveness, found to be present in 
the relevant jurisdiction, was mentioned or discussed during adjudication of racial 
bloc voting. Instead, these two factors were considered only at the totality-of-
circumstances stage, after the court had decided whether bloc voting was present, 
when it canvassed the laundry list of factors from the Senate Report.
193 
Other facts indicative of the presence or absence of racial bloc voting, factors 
not mentioned in the Senate Report, are rarely mentioned. I highlight two. First, 
evidence that voters organize themselves along racial lines suggests a mindset in 
the community that may carry over into the polling booth. Thus, for example, the 
presence in a community of the following, among other factors, might suggest 
racial polarization (although none would be necessarily conclusive): active, racially 
identifiable civic/political organizations that groom or endorse candidates; overall 
campaign strategies, or a substantial quantity of campaign events, designed to 
appeal peculiarly to potential voters of racially defined groups; and politically 
active media institutions serving members of a racial community and covering 
political issues of particular concern to that group.
194 Second, organization and 
action in the legislative body along racial lines, including machinations in the 
districting process, suggest that the electorate views itself along the same racial 
lines and votes accordingly. 
                                                                                                                 
 
  193.   Regarding racial campaign appeals, see Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 
976, 1041 (D.S.D. 2004); United States v. Charleston Cnty., 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 295 
(D.S.C. 2003); Cofield v. City of LaGrange, 969 F. Supp. 749, 777 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Goosby 
v. Town Bd., 956 F. Supp. 326, 342–43 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Reed v. Town of Babylon, 914 F. 
Supp. 843, 859–60 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Vecinos DeBarrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 880 F. 
Supp. 911, 927 (D. Mass. 1995); White v. Alabama, 867 F. Supp. 1519, 1556 (M.D. Ala. 
1994); Meek v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 805 F. Supp. 967, 982 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Magnolia Bar 
Ass’n v. Lee, 793 F. Supp. 1386, 1409–10 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Garza v. Cnty. of L.A., 756 F. 
Supp. 1298, 1341 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Williams v. City of Dallas, 734 F. Supp. 1317 (N.D. 
Tex. 1990); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 212 (E.D. Ark. 1989); McDaniels v. 
Mehfoud, 702 F. Supp. 588, 595 (E.D. Va. 1988); Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513, 
1515 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (employing the Gingles analysis in a nonredistricting case). A few 
cases were ambiguous. See S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281, 
1290 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Alamosa Cnty., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1025–26 (D. 
Colo. 2004); Clark v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 471, app. A (M.D. La. 2001); Smith v. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 801 F. Supp. 1513, 1518 (E.D. Va. 1992); Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044, 
1056 (N.D. Ohio 1991). 
    Regarding non-responsiveness, see Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation v. City 
of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271, 276–77 (2d Cir. 1994); Bone Shirt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1043–47; 
Goosby, 956 F. Supp. at 344–46, 352; Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of City Comm’rs 
Voter Registration Div., 824 F. Supp. 514, 538 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Meek, 805 F. Supp. at 987, 
991, 993; Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 780 F. Supp. 221, 239–41 (D. 
Del. 1991); Armour, 775 F. Supp. at 1058; Williams, 734 F. Supp. at 1406–09; McDaniels, 
702 F. Supp. at 595–96; Dillard v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1467 
(M.D. Ala. 1988). Again, two cases were ambiguous. See Ward v. Columbus Cnty., 782 F. 
Supp. 1097, 1105 (E.D.N.C. 1991); Bradford Cnty. NAACP v. City of Starke, 712 F. Supp. 
1523, 1538 (M.D. Fla. 1989). 
  194.   These and other factors were mentioned by the district court in Bone Shirt, 336 F. 
Supp. 2d 976, an outlier (in a positive sense) in this jurisprudence. 486  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
Why have none of these potential indicators of racial bloc voting appeared in 
judicial opinions on the subject? After 1986, this may have been a matter of path 
dependency: as noted above, even after reciting lower court findings of race-based 
campaigns by successful candidates in the North Carolina legislature, Justice 
Brennan’s opinion in Gingles discussed the issue of racially polarized voting in 
purely numerical terms.
195 The plaintiffs’ victory in Gingles, the roadmap this 
victory offered for future litigants, and the force of precedent in a common-law 
system may have done the rest. But this begs the question; what are the costs of 
relying on nonquantitative evidence in this area? 
One major cost is the danger that in crediting some of the identified types of 
nonquantitative evidence, a court characterizes the actions of voters or of 
potentially powerful actors in the political system as essentially racial, perhaps 
racist. The divisiveness of such a finding, and what may be a corresponding 
reluctance among the judiciary to find such facts,
196 were dangers Justice Brennan 
identified when he articulated the reasons why, in his view, racial bloc voting 
meant racially correlated voting, without regard to whether voting patterns were 
caused by white racial hostility to candidates of minority race.
197 To some extent, 
the dangers here can be overstated. Courts are required to consider the factors listed 
in the Senate Report, including those listed above, at the totality-of-circumstances 
stage, so one might argue that a recognition of the probative value of these facts as 
applied to the Gingles prerequisites does not increase the risk of divisiveness. 
Similarly, courts have sometimes shown considerable impatience with redistricting 
machinations inside a legislative body that they believe to be targeted in some way 
at a minority group, even if such machinations are insufficient to support a formal 
finding of intentional discrimination; in such situations, courts find ways to make 
such evidence relevant.
198 Finally, if racially identifiable campaign events, 
newspapers, and other aspects of the community actually exist, the extent of 
additional damage done by crediting testimony about these circumstances is open 
to debate. 
If I am right about all this, then in certain redistricting contexts, litigators may 
need to change the witnesses they interview, hire, and call. In certain cases, 
testimony regarding racial bloc voting should no longer be the primary domain of 
the quantitatively adept. Instead, the focus should be on persons who make it their 
business to know (or can find out) the politics and the structure of political 
organization in the relevant locality: retired politicians, local nonquantitative 
political scientists, perhaps even journalists.
199 Such persons have specialized 
                                                                                                                 
 
 195.   See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 196.   See Charleston Cnty., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 270. 
  197.   Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 70–74 (1986). 
 198.   See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 441 (2006) 
(objecting to the removal of a Latino opportunity to elect a candidate of choice because 
Latinos were about to exercise it); Black Political Task Force v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 
291, 314–15 (D. Mass. 2004) (objecting to the use of race “as a tool to ensure the protection 
of incumbents”). 
  199.   As an exercise, I interviewed persons who might provide such evidence about the 
city of Boston, including Pulitzer Prize–winning reporter Kenneth Cooper, see supra note 
134, and former head of the Latino advocacy organization Oiste?, Giovanna Negretti. 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 487 
 
knowledge and methods that they can employ to investigate and gain relevant 
information;
200 and as sources of evidence, they appear at least as reliable as the 
testimony by politicians courts sometimes admit and consider regarding racial 
voting patterns.
201 By way of analogy, courts have long considered evidence from 
historians when adjudicating whether districting schemes implemented decades in 
the past were adopted with racially discriminatory intent.
202 
A final objection: some might argue
203 that much of nonquantitative evidence 
highlighted above would come from partisan sources with an intense interest in the 
outcome of any redistricting lawsuit, and thus the corresponding testimony would 
carry a heavy taint of potential bias. The answer is, of course this is true. But that 
does not distinguish redistricting lawsuits from any other type of lawsuit. 
Frequently in current litigation, including civil rights litigation, critical information 
is available only from the parties themselves, who are self-interested. Yet, we trust 
judges and juries to sift through the resulting evidence and to arrive at reasonable 
conclusions in the run of cases. Judges are more practiced at this sifting process 
than they are at assessing the results of ecological inference techniques. Evidence 
of racial bloc voting in redistricting lawsuits has, by virtue of its near-exclusive 
numerical focus, enjoyed a patina of neutrality that it never deserved and that is no 
longer sustainable. In the current era, we must trust judges to do what they are 
practiced at doing. 
IV. A SHORT CASE STUDY: THE BOSTON CITY COUNCIL 
To make the ideas discussed in this paper more concrete, I conduct a brief case 
study focusing on the availability of evidence regarding whether voting is racially 
polarized in Boston City Council contests.
204 First, some basic facts: Boston is a 
true melting pot jurisdiction; according to the 2000 census, Boston’s voting age 
population was 55.4% white, 20.5% black, 12.1% Hispanic or Latino, and 7.7% 
Asian or Pacific Islander.
205 Despite this racial diversity, white candidates have 
enjoyed extraordinary success in the Boston City Council’s non-partisan elections, 
winning 81% of the seats available from 1990 to 2008.
206 Seven of Boston’s nine 
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 200.   See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 201.   See Greiner, supra note 24, at 120. 
 202.   See, e.g., J. Morgan Kousser, Are Expert Witnesses Whores? Reflections on 
Objectivity in Scholarship and Expert Witnessing, PUB. HISTORIAN, Winter 1984, at 5. 
  203.   I thank Elizabeth Warren and Lani Guinier for their comments here. 
  204.   My use of the Boston City Council is to illustrate concepts only. Even if voting in 
Boston were deemed racially polarized, it is not clear which if any minority groups (or even 
coalitions) could meet the first Gingles prerequisite. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 
1231 (2009) (requiring fifty percent majority population); Jessica Trounstine & Melody E. 
Valdini, The Context Matters: The Effects of Single-Member Versus At-Large Districts on 
City Council Diversity, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 554 (2008) (noting that the Latino community in 
Boston is spread across the city). 
 205.   BOS. REDEVELOPMENT AUTH., supra note 143. 
  206.   We must, of course, always keep in mind that section 2 does not provide a right to 
proportional representation. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). 
    The statements made on the Boston City Council’s structure, racial composition, and 
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districts (four seats are elected at-large) have had effective white majorities for the 
past two decades, and these seven have consistently elected white candidates. 
Meanwhile, the other two districts, with 81% and 55% black VAP, have since 1990 
consistently elected black candidates.
207 Between 1990 and 2008, no African 
American won an at-large seat, and the council had only one Asian and one 
Hispanic (each stayed two terms, with one defeated and the other leaving to run for 
mayor).  
Given this record, some inference of racial polarization might arise; 
nevertheless, the 2009 Boston City Council election may have signaled a change.
208 
In 2009, the districted seats behaved as they have before. In the at-large seats, 
however, two incumbents departed the council to launch unsuccessful bids for the 
mayor’s office. Of the eight candidates who survived the subsequent at-large 
preliminary, four were white, two Hispanic, and two black, and the winners were 
two white incumbents, a Hispanic, and an African American. Turnout was the 
highest in several years.
209 
The takeaway message from this Part is that assessment of whether voting is 
racially polarized in Boston City Council elections requires a mix of the results of 
ecological inference methods, survey sampling information, and nonquantitative 
evidence. All these forms of evidence are available at acceptable costs, and they 
can complement one another in ways that the current practices (which focus almost 
exclusively on ecological inference techniques) do not allow. Thus, the city of 
Boston illustrates the benefits of the more holistic approach to racial bloc voting 
that I endorse in this Article. 
I proceed here in three steps. Part IV.A considers information from ecological 
inference techniques. Part IV.B considers survey information. Part IV.C considers 
nonquantitative information. 
A. Information from Ecological Inference 
What can ecological inference methods tell us about voting patterns in city 
council contests in Boston? In summary, they provide evidence of differences 
among whites and blacks, indications of a distinctive Hispanic viewpoint, and 
virtually nothing useful regarding Asians. Blacks tend to support non-white 
                                                                                                                 
newspaper articles, each of which contains a piece of that history. These articles and a 
spreadsheet that compiles the information are available from the author. 
  207.   As of the 2000 census, Districts 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, and 9 were 60% or more white VAP. 
BOS. REDEVELOPMENT  AUTH., supra note 143. District 3 was 47% white VAP, with the 
nearest racial group being African Americans at 28%. Id. CVAP figures by district were not 
available, but given that white CVAP share is usually a few percentage points higher than 
white VAP share of Boston’s population, it seems likely that whites have a majority CVAP 
in District 3 as well. Districts 4 and 7 were 81% and 55% African American VAP, 
respectively. Id. Districts 4 and 7 have without fail elected African American candidates for 
the past two decades. 
 208.   See, e.g., John Ruch, Turner: Jackson Should Replace Me in ’13, JAMAICA PLAIN 
GAZETTE  ONLINE (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.jamaicaplaingazette.com/node/3746 
(discussing a “new political force”). 
 209.   See Edward Mason, Councilor John R. Connolly Comes Out on Top, BOS. HERALD, 
Nov. 4, 2009, at 4; Eric Moskowitz, Voters Pick Newcomers and Stalwarts, BOS. GLOBE, 
Nov. 4, 2009, at 1; Slack & Viser, supra note 138. 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 489 
 
candidates, whites tend to provide far less support to non-white candidates. There is 
some indication that Hispanics support Hispanic candidates. 
First, with respect to Caucasians and African Americans, blunt tools suggest 
racially correlated voting in city council contests dating at least back to 1991 (as far 
back as I investigated) and continuing through the 2007 round of elections. Table 1 
provides an example.
210 
 
Table 1: City of Boston, 2003, At-Large Contest 
  Correlation Coefficients: % Vote for the Candidate Versus  
    % of Precinct’s VAP of Indicated Race 
Candidate
211 Black  White Hispanic Asian 
A -.77  .71  -.17  .20 
B .57  -.63  .30  -.02 
C -.56  .64  -.33  -.03 
D .95  -.87  .21  -.28 
E -.63  .62  -.25  .20 
F .88  -.85  .26  -.21 
G -.66  .65  -.18  .07 
H -.47  .45  -.16  .16 
This contest features eight candidates: five Caucasians, two African Americans, 
and one Hispanic. First question: by looking at the figures in Table 1, can one 
identify the three minority candidates? Looking at the “Black” column, one sees 
that the most positive correlations
212 between percentage of the precinct VAP that 
is black versus percentage of that precinct’s vote going to a candidate occurs for 
Candidates D (.95), F (.88), and B (.57). Bingo. Candidates D and F are the two 
African Americans, Candidate B is the Hispanic. Note that the most positive black 
correlations correspond exactly to the most negative white correlations. 
Second question: by looking at the figures in Table 1, can one identify the four 
winners? Looking at the “White” column, one sees that the highest correlations are 
for Candidates A (.71), G (.65), C (.64), and E (.62). This guess gets three (A, E, 
and G) out of four correct; this 2003 contest was one of the two (out of 117) city 
council contests pre-2009 won by a Hispanic. Note that this candidate, Felix 
Arroyo, Sr. (candidate B), was running as an incumbent, having been named to 
finish the term of a councilman elected in 2001.
213 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210.   See supra note 117 for an explanation as to why I do not use the GQ Model with 
these data. 
  211.   The key: A = Hennigan (W), B = Arroyo (H), C = O’Malley (W), D = Owens (B), 
E = Flaherty (W), F = Garrison (B), G = Murphy (W), H = White (W). A candidate who 
received only four total votes is omitted. 
  212.   Almost all of the correlation coefficients discussed in this section were statistically 
significantly different from zero, but I interpret this fact with caution. The number of 
precincts in Boston (about 250) means that correlations only slightly different from zero may 
be statistically significant. 
 213.   See Yvonne Abraham, ‘I Arrived Here, and the Whole City Was Judging People by 
Their Color,’ BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 26, 2005, at B1. In fact, all four victors in this 2003 contest 
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These patterns repeat almost without fail from 1991 to 2007.
214 Non-white 
(black, Hispanic, or Asian) candidates ran in every year except for 1999. Except for 
one instance, the candidates having the highest correlations with black VAP (and 
the lowest with white VAP) were non-white. The magnitude of the correlations is 
also indicative. Black VAP-black candidate correlations are in the high .7s to the 
low .9s (recall that the highest possible value for a correlation is 1). Black VAP-
Hispanic candidate and black VAP-Asian candidate correlations are typically in the 
.5 to .7 range. White VAP correlations had the same orders of magnitude but with 
negative signs (the lowest possible is -1). The upshot: if we believe these data hold 
information on voting patterns (despite the fragility of all ecological inference 
techniques), they indicate that black voters’ preference ordering is a black 
candidate followed by any non-white candidate, with the least affinity to white 
candidates. White voters prefer white to non-white, and they least prefer black 
candidates.
215 
The picture for Hispanic voters is more complicated. No Hispanic candidates 
survived the preliminary round during the 1990s. Two Hispanics made it to the 
final round prior to 2009, with one (Felix Arroyo, Sr.) running on four occasions. 
Using the “technique” applied above, one can always identify Hispanic candidates 
by looking for the highest Hispanic VAP-candidate correlation, but these 
correlations are of lower magnitude (on the order of .3 to .4) than the black and 
white VAP figures examined above, and Arroyo, Sr. did win twice (both times 
running as an incumbent) before becoming one of the extraordinarily few city 
council incumbents to be defeated in a reelection bid. With respect to Hispanic 
VAP-black candidate combinations, the resulting correlations are positive but mild 
(.1 to .3), and there is an occasional Hispanic VAP-white candidate correlation that 
is higher than these figures. Thus, subject to the usual caveats, there is some 
evidence that Hispanic voters prefer Hispanic candidates, with preferences of 
Hispanic voters vis-à-vis black, white, and Asian candidates uncertain. It is not 
clear whether these figures suggest an absence of race-based preferences or a lack 
of information, as discussed in Part II. 
The Asian VAP correlations are uninformative. Correlations have low 
magnitudes, and no discernible pattern emerges. Again, it is not clear whether this 
signals an absence of race-based preferences among Asian voters or just a shortage 
of information. 
These results should be interpreted with caution. For several reasons, some 
technical,
216 correlation coefficients are blunt instruments. To gain additional 
information, we can try to apply ecological inference techniques to elections other 
than those for city council involving Boston precincts, despite the increasing 
                                                                                                                 
 
  214.   Exact figures are available from the author on request. 
  215.   Note that there is also some evidence that minority voters, particularly blacks, were 
engaging in partial-bullet voting. During the 1990s, the correlation between the percent black 
VAP and the number of votes cast per voter was highly negative (-.6 to -.8). In the 2000s, as 
a few more minority candidates emerged, the picture became more complicated. 
  216.    For example, all candidates on the ballot are included in the figures discussed 
above, even though not all of these candidates obtained a reasonable percentage of the vote. 
But see Teague v. Attala Cnty., 92 F.3d 283, 289 (5th Cir. 1996) (questioning the inclusion 
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danger (as explained above) that voting patterns in these so-called “exogenous” 
elections may be different from those in council contests.
217 I examined five such 
contests; the results, while reinforcing the conclusions suggested above for black 
voters (and to a lesser extent for the white electorate, which appears somewhat 
more willing to vote for black candidates in these exogenous contests), contain less 
than crystal clear indications for Hispanic voters and nothing useful for Asians.
218 
We need more information here, particularly for Hispanics and Asians. 
B. Surveys 
Can surveys provide useful information about Boston City Council contests in a 
usable way? As noted above, I organized two surveys in the 2008 and 2009 
elections conducted in the City of Boston, the first an exit poll, the second a 
telephone survey of past voters who were likely to vote again. The 2008 exit poll 
provided evidence of within-group cohesion among white and black voters as well 
as mild evidence of a difference in views between Hispanic and white voters, but 
these signals were not strong because the 2008 contests were either blowouts or 
ballot initiatives involving issues as to which one would not expect voting to fall 
along racial lines. With respect to Asians, the exit poll, when combined with 
ecological data, was able to produce reasonable estimates of Asian voter 
preferences for certain ballot initiatives, but again, given the subject matter on the 
ballot, one would not expect distinctive preferences. Thus, the primary usefulness 
of this exit poll for present purposes was to demonstrate that one can conduct a 
high-quality poll using students at bearable cost, with results that predict electoral 
outcomes with reasonable accuracy and in a way that produces other useful 
research (making the enterprise attractive to partners who might share costs).
219 
The 2009 telephone survey showed interesting patterns. Recall that of the eight 
unusually talented candidates who sought at-large seats, four were white, two 
Hispanic, and two black; and the winners were two white incumbents, a Hispanic, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 217.   See text accompanying notes 130–36. The danger is particularly acute in Boston. 
See text accompanying note 138. 
  218.   The Massachusetts House of Representatives districts in the City of Boston consist 
of a small number of precincts (some on the order of twenty), making these contests less 
helpful regarding voting patterns in the City generally. Moreover, given Boston’s status as 
an overwhelmingly Democratic town, the general elections available here have less 
information. Of five contests I examined, two, the 2006 gubernatorial primary and the 2008 
presidential primary, are discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 130–36. The 
other three contests are the 1994 and 2002 primaries for Suffolk County District Attorney 
and the 2008 Democratic primary for the Massachusetts Senate’s second Suffolk district, 
with the latter a stretch because it contains only seventy-odd of Boston’s 256 precincts. The 
first two contests featured black candidates against white candidates. The 95% intervals from 
the GQ Model for the support rates for the black candidates in them were as follows: in 1994 
black (.87, .91), white (.56, .57), Hispanic (.10, .78), Asian (.03, .97); and in 2002, black 
(.80, .85), white (.22, .24), Hispanic (.01, .40), and Asian (.00, .52). The senatorial primary 
featured an African American incumbent against a Hispanic/Asian mixed-race challenger. 
The 95% intervals for the challenger were black (.09, .19), white (.77, .86), Hispanic (.01, 
.94), Asian (.00, .93). 
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and an African American. The telephone survey raw data revealed roughly the 
following voting preferences among the racial groups. 
 
Table 2: Support Levels of Boston Voters by Race 
2009 At-Large Seats, Boston City Council 
 Candidate 
Voters W1*  W2*  W3  W4  B1*  B2  H1*  H2 
white High  High  Low  Low  Med  Low  High  -- 
black Low  Low  --  --  High  High  High  -- 
Hispanic  Low  Low --  -- Low  Low  V  High  High 
Asian  Med  Med --  -- Low  Low Med  -- 
Here, W1 through W4 are the four white candidates, B1 and B2 the two African 
Americans, and H1 and H2 the two Hispanics. A “*” symbol identifies the four 
winners.
220 “Med” means a medium level of support, “V” means “very,” and a “--” 
symbol means minimal support.
221 
Table 2 illustrates the challenges this paper has discussed. Black and Hispanic 
voters in Boston clearly preferred candidates of their own race, and as suggested 
above, black voters prefer candidates of color. White voter behavior was more 
complex, with whites strongly supporting two white candidates and one Hispanic, 
and supporting to a lesser extent an African American. With no Asian in the 
contest, Asian voting behavior essentially mirrored that of whites. Thus, racial 
differences are clear, and white voters controlled the result in the sense that the four 
most white-preferred candidates prevailed. And yet two of four at-large seats were 
won by candidates of color, although one should keep in mind this meant that white 
candidates won nine of thirteen seats in the Boston City Council (because the 
districted seats split directly along racial lines).
222 
C. Nonquantitative Information 
What information can nonquantitative sources provide about voting patterns in 
Boston City Council contests, particularly the at-large seats? My goal here is not to 
provide the kind of comprehensive evaluation that an expert witness, such as a 
nonquantitative political scientist or an expert in Boston city politics, could 
produce. Instead, I demonstrate that nonquantitative sources provide solid ground 
upon which such an appropriately trained and informed witness could build a 
useful opinion on racial bloc voting. 
In city council and mayoral contests in Boston for at least the past several years, 
a major cleavage has been between “New” and “Old” Boston,
223 a distinction that is 
                                                                                                                 
 
  220.   W1 = Murphy, W2 = Connolly, W3 = Bennett, W4 = Kenneally, B1 = Pressley,  
B2 = Jackson, H1 = Arroyo, H2 = Gonzalez. 
  221.   The portion of the telephone survey generating these data was a joint project with 
Stephen Ansolabehere. We are still analyzing the resulting data. 
 222.   See supra note 206–07 and accompanying text. 
 223.   See Moskowitz, supra note 138; Dan Payne, Some Comfort for Old Boston, BOS. 
GLOBE, Sept. 3, 2009, at 17; The New Boston Is Running, WBUR, supra note 138. 2011]  RE-SOLIDIFYING RACIAL BLOC VOTING 493 
 
partly but not completely defined by race. Old Boston is whiter (typically Irish and 
Italian), more conservative, and older. Also part of the Old Boston coalition are city 
employees, who are disproportionately white and who for over a decade have 
turned out to support the incumbent (white) mayor.
224 New Boston is 
predominantly minority (but also includes the odd white yuppie/intellectual), 
progressive, younger, and more likely to be recently arrived to the nation and to the 
city.
225 Old Boston has traditionally dominated city politics, both the city council 
and the mayor’s office, by turning out in greater numbers, and it has usually been 
perceived as having voted for white (frequently Irish and Italian) city council 
candidates.
226 
In the past decade, the Old/New Boston split translated into a division on the 
council itself, a division defined by race. The division was evident early in the 
2000s in a redistricting dispute. A white council president (eleven of the city’s 
thirteen councilors at that time were white) replaced the black chair of the council’s 
post–Census 2000 redistricting committee after the latter proposed a redistricting 
plan that would have increased to four the number of majority-non-white districts 
in the city. The new, white committee chair proposed the current plan (which will 
be used until 2013), which had two predominantly black districts and one district 
with a razor-thin non-white majority but which (due to citizenship figures and the 
fact that the non-whites here are a combination of Boston’s three non-white racial 
groups) is effectively dominated by white voters.
227 The deposed black redistricting 
committee chair interpreted this turn of events as due to race-based concerns.
228 
Thereafter, two black and one Hispanic (the only non-white) councilors formed 
a coalition called “Team Unity,” which caucused together, established left-leaning 
positions on issues, and voted as a bloc, a bloc typically outvoted by the remaining 
members of the council.
229 Team Unity endorsed another non-white candidate, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 224.   See, e.g., Yawu Miller, Kickoff Event Shows Menin’s Strength, BAY ST. BANNER, 
Apr. 30, 2009, at 12, available at http://www.baystatebanner.com/local15-2009-04-30; 
Payne, supra note 223; Richard Weir, Foes to Mayor: Stop Painting Cabinet White, BOS. 
HERALD, Sept. 7, 2009, at 5. 
 225.   See, e.g., Miller, supra note 138; Jason Zengerle & Michelle Cottle, Uncommon 
Ground, NEW REPUBLIC, July 15, 2009, at 8; David S. Bernstein, Yoon or Flaherty, BOS. 
PHOENIX (Aug. 12, 2009), http://thePhoenix.com/Boston/News/88005-Yoon-or-Flaherty. 
 226.   See, e.g., Pete Stidman, Arroyo Out, Connolly in for At-Large Council; Anemic 
Turnout Across City, DORCHESTER REP. (Nov. 7, 2007, 8:00 PM), http://www.dotnews.com/ 
2007/arroyo-out-connolly-large-council-anemic-turnout-across-city. 
 227.   See MAUREEN E. FEENEY, BOS. CITY COUNCIL, 2002 COMM. ON CENSUS AND REDIST. 
REP., 10–12 (Oct. 2, 2002), available at http://www.cityofboston.gov/cityCouncil/pdfs/ 
approved_report.pdf; Sarah Schweitzer, Councilor Wants to Shift District Map, BOS. GLOBE, 
Oct. 30, 2001, at B2; Sarah Schweitzer, Lack of Minority Clout Seen in Council Shift, BOS. 
GLOBE, Feb. 18, 2002, at A1; Frederick Warren Goldberg, Promise Unfulfilled: The Failure 
of the 1981 Boston City Council Electoral Reforms 47–50 (Mar. 2007) (unpublished senior 
thesis, Harvard College) (on file with the author). 
 228.   Goldberg,  supra note 227, at 49–50. 
 229.   See Donovan Slack, Photo Puts a Focus on City Council Rift—Minority Group 
Draws Criticism, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2006, at 2B; David S. Bernstein, The Rumor Mill, 
BOS.  PHOENIX (Sep. 5, 2007), http://thephoenix.com/Boston/News/46776-rumor-
mill/?rel=inf. 494  INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.  86:447 
 
Asian Sam Yoon, for an at-large council seat in 2005. Yoon won and joined the 
coalition,
230 which lasted two more years until Felix Arroyo, Sr., the Hispanic, lost. 
Arroyo’s defeat represented only the second time (out of twenty-seven instances) 
since 1993 that a sitting at-large incumbent lost a reelection bid on the Boston City 
Council. 
Some city council campaigns have had racial elements, but not always in the 
traditional way of white candidates appealing to white racism or broadcasting 
minority candidates’ races. Several minority candidates emphasized their own races 
in an effort to build a coalition of New Boston voters
231 (white candidates generally 
do not emphasize their races or ethnicities, but it may be that they do not need to do 
so given the strong signals communicated by their Irish and Italian surnames).
232 
And some candidates of color run against the white establishment,
233 suggesting 
distinct viewpoints. Finally, a variety of recent issues in Boston, such as rezoning 
of public schools
234 and an alleged dearth of minorities in the mayor’s cabinet
235 
have racial overtones. But other issues, such as a reform of the Criminal Offender 
Record Information law, have not.
236 
What in particular can nonquantitative evidence tell us with respect to voting 
patterns of Asians, the racial group for which quantitative evidence had proven 
somewhat unhelpful? Questions about voting administration, particularly 
transliteration of candidate names and access to interpreters and bilingual ballots in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 230.   See Yawu Miller, Yoon Gets Endorsement from Councilors of Color, BAY  ST. 
BANNER, Oct. 20, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.baystate-banner.com/archives/ 
stories/2005/102005-3.htm. Some credited Yoon’s win to the Team Unity endorsement. Phil 
Tajitsu Nash, Time for the Tea Party, ASIAN  WEEK (Nov. 18, 2005), 
http://www.asianweek.com/2005/11/18/time-for-the-tea-party/#. 
 231.   See, e.g., Adam Gaffin, City Council Candidates: Demand More Money from 
Colleges, Hospitals, UNIVERSAL  HUB (June 23, 2009, 10:17 PM), 
http://www.universalhub.com/node/25999 (reporting opening statement by candidate 
Ayanna Pressley, “There has never been a woman of color on the Boston City Council”). 
 232.   Recent successful at-large candidates have included Councilors Murphy, Connolly, 
Flaherty, Hennigan, O’Neil, and Menino. See Interview with Kenneth Cooper, supra note 
134 (“There is still a fair amount of voting by surname in Boston.”). 
 233.   See Bernstein, supra note 229; Interview with Kenneth Cooper, supra note 134. 
 234.   See John Ruch, 15 Run for 8 At-Large City Council Slots on Final Ballot, JAMAICA 
PLAIN  GAZETTE  ONLINE (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.jamaicaplaingazette.com/node/3586 
(reporting statement by candidate Tomas Gonzalez “that recent school zone proposals were 
mostly about white parents not wanting ‘brown kids going to school with white-colored 
kids’”). 
 235.   See Weir, supra note 224; Gintautas Dumcius, Yoon, Menino Aides Clash at 
Mattapan Forum, DORCHESTER  REP. (July 29, 2009, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.dotnews.com/litdrop/2009/yoon-menino-aides-clash-mattapan-forum; John 
Ruch, Flaherty Vows BRA, ISD Reform, JAMAICA PLAIN GAZETTE ONLINE (July 9, 2009), 
http://jamaicaplaingazette.com/node/3505.  But see Bianca Vazquez Toness, Sam Yoon, 
Activist for Mayor, WBUR.ORG (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.wbur.org/2009/08/03/mayoral-
profile-yoon (reporting that the incumbent has long counted on support from “African 
Americans, Latinos and lefties”). 
 236.   See Editorial, New Visions for Boston Council, BOS. GLOBE, July 23, 2009, at 16; 
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polling places, have unified Asian-Bostonian voters, with the latter issues resulting 
in the United States Department of Justice suing the city.
237 But the primary 
opponent here was the Secretary of State; the Boston City Council unanimously 
endorsed transliteration in 2007.
238 With respect to candidates, the fortunes of 
Councilman Sam Yoon may be instructive. Yoon ran for a city council seat in 
2005, and was successful in his first attempt (after the Team Unity endorsement 
mentioned above), a rare feat. Yoon has consistently emphasized his ethnicity in 
his campaigns
239 and has attempted to build a pan-Asian coalition, to the extent of 
using fortune cookie prompts (Yoon is Korean American) and handouts in 
campaign rallies.
240 He was reelected to the council in 2007, and in 2009, he 
abandoned his city council seat for an unsuccessful run at the mayor’s office. His 
fundraising efforts made news with their emphasis on out-of-city Asian donors.
241 
Ultimately, Yoon placed last among the three “serious” candidates in the 2009 
preliminary mayoral elections.
242 
To conclude: there appears to be a rich amount of nonquantitative information 
upon which an appropriately trained or placed expert could build an opinion as to 
the cohesiveness and voting patterns of Boston’s four major racial groups. None of 
an expert’s conclusions would be certain, but the point here is comparative. 
Certainty has never been the standard, and it has never been provided by the 
quantitative evidence upon which courts have relied heavily in the past. 
D. Conclusion Regarding the City of Boston 
On the basis of all this evidence, and using the forward-looking definition of 
racial bloc voting identified in this paper, is voting racially polarized in Boston City 
Council contests? In my view, the issue is extremely close. It would be difficult to 
characterize council contests as post- or non-racial, and the lack of success of 
candidates of minority race is troubling. The council’s districted seats have 
remained solidly identifiable by race. The 2009 success of an African American 
and a Hispanic for two at-large open seats suggests that racial barriers are not 
insurmountable, but equality of opportunity, not surmountability of barriers, is the 
                                                                                                                 
 
  237.   Complaint, United States v. City of Boston, No. 05-11598 WGY (D. Mass. 2005), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_203/documents/boston_comp.php; see also 
Jared Lindh, Asian Voters Renew Call for Bilingual Ballot Mandate, BAY ST. BANNER, Feb. 
26, 2009, at 21, available at http://www.baystatebanner.com/local18-2009-02-2. 
 238.   See Lindh, supra note 237. 
 239.   See, e.g., Brian C. Mooney, Reaching Out to a New Generation, Yoon Stubborn in 
Quest for Change, BOS.  GLOBE (Sept. 6, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/local/ 
massachusetts/articles/2009/09/06/reaching_out_to_a_new_generation; Vazquez Toness, 
supra note 235. 
  240.   John C. Drake, Trying To Walk Fine Line on Ethnicity, Yoon Reaches out in Bid for 
Mayor, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 25, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/ 
massachusetts/articles/2009/03/25/trying_to_walk_fine_line_on_ethnicity. 
 241.   See Jessica Van Sack, Jet-Setting Pol Sam Yoon Flew the Coop, BOS. HERALD, Oct. 
1, 2009, at 5. 
 242.   See Adam Reilly, Asians for Yoon—Or Maybe the Other Guy(s), BOS. PHOENIX 
(July 10, 2009), http://thephoenix.com/Boston/News/86242-Asians-for-Yoon-or-maybe-the-
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test. Were a section 2 lawsuit to be filed today, and if the record consisted of the 
information presented above, I would find voting to be racially polarized, but by a 
razor-thin evidentiary margin. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems clear that the days in which “documenting racially polarized voting is 
generally . . . ‘just beating the obvious’”
243 are gone. If so, then the discussion in 
Parts I to IV of this Article might be thought to raise two final questions: First, do 
the empirical difficulties identified here suggest that the Voting Rights Act is no 
longer necessary? In other words, does the fact that we may now have more trouble 
discerning how members of different racial groups vote, the “reasons” for such 
patterns,
244 and the prospects for success among minority-preferred candidates 
indicate that voting is no longer racially identifiable in a way that matters? Second, 
if we concede the possibility that voting in some locations and as to some electoral 
contests may be racially polarized, is it now simply too difficult as an 
empirical/evidentiary matter to distinguish situations in which bloc voting does 
exist from situations in which it does not? One could phrase this second question in 
terms of whether identifying situations characterized by racially polarized voting 
might require an undue investment of scarce resources (time, money, judicial 
attention), or whether the risk of erroneous decisions is too high even if the needed 
resources are invested. 
With respect to the first question, difficulty of proof is conceptually distinct 
from whether a legal prohibition remains necessary, and in my view, it is hard to 
credit an argument linking the two. A principal theme of Part II of this Article is 
that the increasingly multi-racial nature of the United States polity is alone enough 
to make analysis of racial voting patterns more difficult. But the fact that we as a 
nation are becoming more racially diverse, by itself, says nothing about whether we 
as a nation are becoming more racially tolerant. Irrational prejudices may increase 
or decrease with greater exposure to racial “others.” Thus, the fact that the 
increasingly multi-racial nature of United States polities makes bloc voting analysis 
harder does not necessarily suggest a decreased need for vote dilution law; it may 
instead suggest the opposite. Without careful empirical analysis, we will not know 
which is true. Further, and as noted above, in some jurisdictions, there is evidence 
that blacks vote against Hispanic candidates of choice (often in Democratic 
primaries) at higher rates than do whites, and vice versa.
245 This pattern may not be 
universal, but its potential existence in certain jurisdictions suggests racial 
animosities may exist among groups previously characterized as “minorities” 
(although it may soon be that there is no “majority” racial group). If so, then even 
assuming for the moment a decrease in white bloc voting, the need for vote dilution 
law may persist. Again, the fact that racial bloc voting has become harder to litigate 
says nothing about whether the Voting Rights Act is less necessary. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 243.   Engstrom,  supra note 17, at 495. 
  244.   Again, I find the focus on “reasons” and causal concepts in this area unhelpful, but 
per Part I.B.2, not all courts agree. 
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With respect to the second question, a principal theme of Parts I and III of this 
Article is that adjudicating racial bloc voting may appear difficult and expensive 
because litigators and courts have not yet deployed available resources and 
methodologies that could provide important information. I have demonstrated here 
that more sophisticated ecological inference methods, sample surveys, and 
nonquantitative evidence can help a great deal in this area, and that these sources of 
information have as yet rarely played any role in the adjudication of racial bloc 
voting. At a minimum, we should not give up on litigating racial bloc voting well 
until we have deployed these additional methodologies and found them wanting. 
Ultimately, the concerns articulated here appear to reflect a feeling that vote 
dilution law is an unneeded relic of the past. Vote dilution skeptics might point to 
events such as the successful campaigns of Barack Obama and Duval Patrick, the 
growing population of Hispanics in the United States, and the increased number of 
African American officeholders at various levels government to contend that race 
consciousness in districting is no longer necessary. In response, I note that we were 
here before, over twenty years ago,
246 and yet the next two decades saw dozens of 
reported findings of vote dilution,
247 along with several findings of intentional 
discrimination in districting.
248 
Further, arguments that changes in the world have made vote dilution law 
unnecessary are fundamentally odd. They ultimately depend on some kind of 
feeling that we can abandon vote dilution law because voting is no longer racially 
polarized, which rather obviously puts the cart before the horse. Bloc voting 
defines the vote dilution injury. If the application of the relevant empirical 
techniques and properly calibrated doctrine demonstrate that racially polarized 
voting is a thing of the past, then vote dilution litigation will wither away on its 
own. Meanwhile, bloc voting has always been a local concept, something that 
exists in some areas of the country and not others, and as to some political offices 
and not others. In short, if our nation has changed, good empirics will tell us so. If 
it has not, good empirics will tell us that. Either way, there seems little justification 
for abandoning vote dilution law based on an intuition (as opposed to solid 
empirics) regarding what is going on across the country; instead, the wiser course is 
to clarify what needs clarification, but to let the empirics tell us how to decide 
cases. 
   
                                                                                                                 
 
 246.   See T HERNSTROM, supra note 179, at 240–44. For a response to Thernstrom and 
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 247.   See Katz et al., supra note 44, at 656.  
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